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Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade in Favor 







 It is time for the European Union to dump the EU-ETS cap-and-
trade system, as it is not working. By adopting a carbon tax with 
reinvestment, the European Union (EU) could reduce its economy-wide 
emissions by forty-eight percent (and emissions from buildings and utilities 
by sixty-five percent) within twenty years while automatically putting in 
place a border tax adjustment. By adopting the carbon tax with 
reinvestment, the EU's trading partners would be heavily encouraged to 
adopt the same system, thereby dramatically reducing global emissions. 
This adoption would occur much like the EU adopting the Value-Added Tax 
and 150 countries following within a short time after. The impacts would be 
dramatic, from potentially reducing emissions in the United States by forty-
nine percent and emissions from building and utilities by sixty-seven 
percent over twenty years to China actually reducing its emissions over the 
next twenty years by a nineteen percent reduction in emissions for buildings 
and utilities, and a thirteen percent economy-wide reduction instead of 
almost doubling them. This system would also encourage countries such as 
Brazil and Malaysia to stop deforesting or else lose access to the world's 
largest markets for their exports. 
 The EU countries would utilize the proceeds from the tax, once 
collected, to rebuild the electric power grid in order to significantly reduce 
carbon emissions. The structure thereby creates both a penalty for states 
that emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases and an incentive for 
states to significantly change their emissions profile by investing in clean 
hybrid energy resources. 
 The EU once again has an opportunity to lead the world in climate 
change mitigation by adopting a tax that will fund the replacement of its 
current energy infrastructure, not only reducing emissions, but also 
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increasing the region’s energy security and reducing its reliance on 
unreliable energy suppliers. 
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CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT 357 
I. Introduction 
A. Global Climate Change Implications 
 
 Global climate change has the potential to alter the landscape and 
characteristics of planet Earth as we know it.1 The twelve warmest years in 
recorded history have all occurred in the past fifteen years, the oceanic 
temperature has recently reached record highs, and ice in the Arctic is 
melting faster than most models predicted.2 A recent NASA-led study 
covering a fifty-year period discovered that higher temperatures are causing 
tropical forests to absorb less and less carbon dioxide every year.3 Climate 
scientists have successfully provided analyses that yield “very high” 
confidence in attributing the bulk of the past fifty years’ rise in global 
temperature to human-caused greenhouse gas (GHG)4 emissions.5 Some 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See generally THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010 (2010), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-
1226014527953/WDR10-Full-Text.pdf (discussing the effect that climate change will have 
on the planet and the need for mitigation efforts) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS 
REPORT] (synthesizing the scientific evidence of global climate change and discussing the 
effect that it will have on human populations) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also Stephen Sewalk, Project 
Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, 3 THE ENGINEERING PROJECT ORG. J. 141, 142 
(2012) (collecting research cataloguing the “irreversible processes” which may result from 
continued climate change, including ocean warming, loss of forests, and coastal flooding). 
 2. See generally IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1; see also President Barack 
Obama, ‘We Need to Act,’ Transcript of Obama’s Climate Change Speech, BLOOMBERG 
(2013), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/-we-need-to-act-
transcript-of-obama-s-climate-change-speech.html (showing the President categorizing these 
climatic changes as scientific “facts”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 3. See Weile Wang et al., Variations in Atmospheric CO2 Growth Rates Coupled 
With Tropical Temperatures, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 13061, 13061 
(2013) (noting that this finding represents a “diagnostic tool for improved understanding of 
the contemporary and future global carbon cycle”). 
 4. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1.5, May 9, 1992, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-381771 U.N.T.S. 107 (defining “greenhouse gases” as “those gaseous 
constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit 
infrared radiation”); see also David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN. TAX 
J. 2063, 2065 (2003) (explaining that different gases have different effects on global 
warming, so emissions are standardized to CO2 equivalents when measuring effects on 
global warming). 
 5. See Camille Parmesan et al., Beyond Climate Change Attribution in Conservation 
and Ecological Research, 16 ECOLOGY LETTERS 58, 69 (2013) (showing that global meta-
analysis provides the “most reliable, scientifically defensible and robust” approach to detect 
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climate scientists believe that Earth has already been irrevocably damaged 
by excess carbon emissions, effectively changing the atmospheric 
composition of our planet.6 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), fossil fuel consumption accounts for the majority 
of anthropogenic GHG emissions.7 Many of the natural resources that have 
nurtured our survival and growth as a species—and represent the livelihood 
for entire industries and populations—are in peril.8 Efforts to make the 
general populace aware of GHG emissions are leading to an outcry for 
countries to address their carbon emissions.9 Without legislation to 
drastically curb the amount of GHG emitted into the atmosphere, the future 
of the earth’s habitable environments may be irrevocably altered, and we 
may be jeopardizing the future of our own species.10 
 These uncontrolled, rapid increases in GHG emissions create a 
significant risk of further adverse impacts to the environment, potentially 
resulting in irreversible changes.11 Global climate change could lead to 
melting snowcaps and glaciers, rising sea levels, and changing weather 
patterns (resulting in flooding and draughts).12 Since 1880, it is estimated 
that the sea level has risen approximately eight inches due to global 
                                                                                                                                         
long-term global climate change, strongly evidencing the anthropogenic contributions to 
climate change). 
 6. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationary is Dead” Long Live Transformation: Five 
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 27 (2010) 
(outlining the positive feedback loop which results in higher atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases). 
 7. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON 
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION SUMMARY FOR POLICY 
MAKERS 7 (2011), available at http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_SPM.pdf 
(showing that, in 2004, 56.6% of CO2 from fossil fuels was the highest single emission 
comprising the GHG composition) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 8. See Ove Hoegh-Guldberg & John F. Bruno, The Impact of Climate Change on the 
World’s Marine Ecosystems, 328 SCIENCE 1523, 1523 (2010) (providing the example of 
rapidly changing marine ecosystems, threatening populations and industries given the 
“overwhelming importance of the ocean to life on our planet”). 
 9. See Terry Townshend & Sam Fankhauser, How National Legislation Can Help to 
Solve Climate Change, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 430, 430 (2013) (noting that the 
stagnation of international climate negotiations has increased the passage of national 
legislation on climate across the globe). 
 10. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 141–42 (listing human health effects including 
substantial increases in malnutrition and cardio-respiratory diseases). 
 11. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 (arguing for mitigation of 
GHG emissions due to “inertia in the climate system, meaning that warming and its 
impacts . . . are to a considerable extent irreversible”). 
 12. See Brian C. Murray & Heather Hosterman, Climate Change, Cap and Trade, and 
the Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 699 (2009) (showing that 
significant climate and weather impacts have occurred around the globe in nearly every 
ecosystem). 
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warming.13 Scientists estimate an additional twenty- to eighty-inch rise in 
sea level is possible during this century.14 In the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
alone, as many as 490,000 properties are at risk of flooding due to rising sea 
levels; the risk of rising sea levels affects all countries with ocean 
shorelines.15 In the U.S., approximately five million people live in 2.6 
million homes that are less than four feet above high tide.16 Climate change 
will affect infrastructure, agriculture, and lifestyle, potentially leading to 
decreasing standards of living, especially in communities that have 
economies sensitive to variations in climate.17 This includes many of 
developing countries that have primarily agricultural economies.18 
 
B. Responses to Climate Change 
 
 In response to this increasingly pressing situation, many nations 
have sought to implement climate change legislation that will lead to lower 
GHG emissions.19 Many proposals for regulation of GHG emissions, 
however, have failed to persuade legislatures to embrace holistic climate 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. See BEN STRAUSS, CLAUDIA TEBALDI & REMIK ZIEMLINSKI, SURGING SEAS: A 
CLIMATE CENTRAL REPORT 2 (2012), available at 
http://slr.s3.amazonaws.com/SurgingSeas.pdf [hereinafter SURGING SEAS] (adding that the 
rate of sea level rise is accelerating and some scientists estimate another twenty to eighty 
inches of sea level rise by the end of the century) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 14. See id. (explaining the relationship between a rising sea level and the increased 
probability of dangerous floods due to storm surges). 
 15. See Climate Change Explained, ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/climatechange/31802.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) 
(“Small island states, including 15 nations found in the Pacific, may face the most dire and 
immediate consequences.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 16. See SURGING SEAS, supra note 13, at 2 (“In 285 cities and towns, more than half 
the population lives on land below this line, potential victims of increasingly likely climate-
induced coastal flooding.”). 
 17. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 37 (2010) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (providing 
examples of flooding coastal regions, contaminated freshwater sources, and exacerbated 
droughts in equatorial regions leading to decreased food security and malnourishment). 
 18. See id. (citing drought conditions and supplies of freshwater as the reason for this 
correlation). 
 19. See Nate Loewentheil, Of Stasis and Movements: Climate Legislation in the 111th 
Congress 5–6 (Yale Univ. Inst. For Soc. & Pol’y Stud. Working Paper No. ISPS12-020, 
2013) (discussing attempts by the U.S. Congress to pass climate change legislation) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see 
also Townshend & Fankhauser, supra note 9, at 430 (highlighting “nearly 300 pieces of 
climate change legislation or regulations of similar importance in . . . 33 countries”). 
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change reform.20 Nations may be waiting to see a well-implemented, 
efficient policy up and running in another nation before they attempt to 
adopt mitigation legislation for themselves.21 This reluctance on the part of 
lawmakers around the globe can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including a fear of harming domestic business, a lack of confidence in 
proposed climate change schemes, and the continued skepticism of certain 





 China has experienced astounding economic growth in the past 
thirty years, which has both greatly increased the country’s GDP, and 
inundated the nation with environmental problems stemming from that 
rapid development.23 Consequently, economic losses due to environmental 
degradation and pollution account for roughly ten percent of China’s gross 
national income.24 China is now the largest national emitter of CO2 in the 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. See Townshend & Frankhauser, supra note 9, at 430 (noting that the “number of 
laws is not a perfect indicator of a country’s response to climate change”). 
 21. See id. (adding that some nations choose to pass laws related to disaster 
management before making the leap to climate change mitigation, showing the “close link 
between adaptation to climate change and the management of normal climate variability”). 
 22. See Andrew J. Hoffman, Talking Past Each Other? Cultural Framing of Skeptical 
and Convinced Logistics in the Climate Change Debate, 24 ORG. & ENVT. 3, 4 (2011) 
(analyzing the social science research done to show the existence of “climate skeptics” and 
the effect of these groups on collective political action). 
 23. JUNJIE ZHANG, ASIA SOCIETY POL’Y INST., DELIVERING ENVIRONMENTALLY 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE CASE OF CHINA 2 (2012) (“China has achieved 
miraculous economic growth over the past 30 years . . . . However, growing the gross 
domestic product (GDP) at any cost has created a series of social and environmental 
problems.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 24. See id. (asserting that China’s attempt to grow its economy “at any cost” created a 
series of social and environmental problems). 
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world.25 However, China’s role in remedying its high levels of emissions is 
somewhat undefined.26 
 China is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol,27 an international treaty 
that addresses GHG emissions and anthropomorphic climate change; 
however, the nation is exempt from the emissions lowering benchmarks 
proposed in the agreement.28 Accordingly, even though China has failed to 
meet any of the emission reductions called for by the international 
agreement, it has seen no negative repercussions.29 In 2008, China initiated 
a carbon-trading scheme that operates to lower GHG emissions through a 
voluntary carbon market.30 A number of private companies manage this 
carbon-trading scheme; however, the Chinese government appears to be 
supporting the carbon markets, as are local governmental entities 
throughout China.31 Despite the top-down approach, the government has no 
plans to establish a unified trading system for the country and seems 
satisfied to allow domestic emitters to create their own carbon markets.32 
 
2. Other Developing Countries 
 
 In general, developed countries are quite concerned that heavy 
restrictions on carbon emissions will apply only to domestic producers and 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. See International Energy Statistics: Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the 
Consumption of Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: INDEPENDENT STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90 &pid=44&aid=8 (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter International Energy Statistics] (noting that China emitted over 
8.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2011) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also ZHANG, supra note 23, at 
5–6 (noting that the major contributors to CO2 emissions are increased urbanization and new 
transportation systems, coal mining and combustion for increased energy demands, and 
rapid industrial development resulting in resource depletion and environmental pollution). 
 26. See ZHANG, supra note 23, at 7 (adding that energy use and GHG emissions in 
China will continue to rise as income increases). 
 27. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148. 
 28. See ZHANG, supra note 23, at 19 (“Because of the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility,’ China is not subject to the quantified emissions limitation and 
reduction commitment in the Kyoto Protocol.”). 
 29. See id. (discussing a lack of “meaningful participation” on the part of China). 
 30. See Yitian Huang, Policy Experimentation and Emergence of Domestic Voluntary 
Carbon Trading in China, 30 EAST ASIA 67, 68 (2013) (highlighting three voluntary 
exchanges in China allowing sellers and buyers to trade carbon credits). 
 31. See id. at 80 (“[T]he Chinese central government provides general support for 
voluntary carbon trading, with local governments being crucial to the proliferation of state-
controlled exchanges.”). 
 32. See id. at 80–81 (noting that this non-unified system allows for domestic players to 
experiment with various scales and structures for provincial exchanges). 
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not imports, leading to carbon leakage.33 Carbon leakage occurs when a 
developed country threatens or puts into effect restrictions on carbon 
emissions (cap-and-trade, for example) and subsequently emission-
dependent industries relocate to developing countries with no emissions 
restrictions.34 Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that this occurred during 
the 1990s and 2000s.35 The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, 
which led to the Kyoto Protocol, called upon developed countries to reduce 
GHG emissions.36 Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing 
countries with no emissions objectives or restrictions boomed following 
these announcements leading to rapidly rising emissions in developing 
countries.37 It appears that developed countries promising or actually 
capping emissions resulted in significant FDI into developing countries, 
allowing “nations to benefit from the omission to internalize environmental 
negativities could be both environmentally and economically counter-
productive . . . if mobile taxpaying industries relocate to pollution haven 
countries that offer little environmental regulation.”38 A significant amount 
of this FDI investment was directed to the “BRIC” nations.39 In addition, 
the indirect consequence of Rio and Kyoto may have been to increase 
global emissions.40 
 This FDI not only propelled domestic growth, but also in many 
cases encouraged the development of trade globally to take advantage of 
cheap labor and non-existent or rarely-enforced environmental 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. See Glen P. Peters & Edgar G. Hertwich, Trading Kyoto, 2 NATURE REP. 40, 40 
(2008) (discussing hypothetical examples of carbon emissions from producers, often located 
in developing nations not restricted by the emissions standards of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 34. See id. at 41 (noting that the IPCC’s definition of carbon leakage only considers 
leakage resulting from the Kyoto Protocol whereas in reality, the growth in China 
contributes a non-negligible amount to the problem). 
 35. See id. (explaining the reasons for increased emissions in developing countries). 
 36. See James D. Desmond, The Earth Summit and Limits on Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions: Reading Between the Lines, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 357, 357 (1993) 
(showing that participants at the Summit proposed that “industrialized nations stabilize their 
carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000”). 
 37. See id. at 365 (arguing that “by the year 2025 developing countries will be 
responsible for nearly 50% of the world’s carbon dioxide output”). 
 38. John M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental Tax 
Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 12 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 149, 157–58 (2010). 
 39. See JIM O’NEIL, GOLDMAN SACHS, BUILDING BETTER ECONOMIC BRICS (2001), 
available at http://www.content.gs.com/japan/ideas/brics/building-better-pdf.pdf (defining 
BRICs as a term coined by Goldman Sachs to represent the largest and quickest growing 
developing countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 40. See Peters & Hertwich, supra note 33, at 40 (pointing to Kyoto’s exemption of 
developing nations as the source of carbon leakage and, therefore, increased carbon 
emissions globally). 
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regulations.41 This is why China has attempted to shift the blame of its 
emissions to importers of its goods, blaming fifteen percent of its emissions 
on exports to western countries,42 a situation not anticipated by Kyoto.43 
Even though the European Union (the “EU”) and the U.S. have minimized 
increases in their emissions levels since 2000, based on emissions 
intensities (GDP/total GHG emissions) of imports versus exports, total 
emissions including imports have skyrocketed.44 Meanwhile, countries such 
as Brazil and Malaysia continue to contribute to global emissions by cutting 
down their forests.45 These concerns led to U.S. legislation (Waxman-
Markey bill) that proposed a carbon tax on imports for countries that do not 
internalize the cost of emissions.46 In addition, this is why the EU has 
                                                                                                                                         
 41. See GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCIL ON GLOBAL TRADE AND FDI, FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AS A KEY DRIVER FOR TRADE, GROWTH AND PROSPERITY: THE CASE FOR A 
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 7 (2013) (explaining how FDI drove trade in 
sub-Saharan Africa). 
 42. See Duncan Clark, West Blamed for Rapid Increase in China’s CO2, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/feb/23/china-
co2-emissions-climate (discussing China’s deflection of blame for its CO2 emissions) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 43. See Peters & Hertwich, supra note 33, at 40 (describing the unanticipated 
consequences of Kyoto). 
 44. See Press Release, European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Growing Faster Since 2000: New Data on Worldwide Emissions 1970–2005 
(May 25, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_090525_newsrelease_edgar.pdf (noting a fifteen 
percent increase in emissions between the years 2000 and 2005) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). This is 
primarily due to carbon leakage of industry moving from the U.S., EU, and Japan to China, 
which has possibly had the unintended result of increasing global emissions by moving 
production from low emission intensity countries to high emission intensity countries. See 
Truby, supra note 38, at 157–58 (explaining that relocation of industries to pollution-haven 
countries could even increase pollution levels). 
 45. See Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, WORLD 
WILDLIFE FOUNDATION, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/forest_climate2 
/forests_and_climate_change/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (explaining that twenty percent of 
global emissions come from deforestation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). A carbon tax policy needs to take this source 
into account, thereby discouraging Brazil and Malaysia from cutting down their forests. See 
Michael Obersteiner, et al., Economics of Avoiding Deforestation 2 (Oct. 16, 2006) 
(presented at Climate Mitigation Measures in the Agro-Forestry Sector and Biodiversity 
Futures, International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy, Oct. 16–17, 2006), 
available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.168.1653&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(explaining that a carbon tax of nine U.S. dollars per ton of carbon could reduce 
deforestation by half) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 46. See generally Analysis of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, 
NRDC LEGISLATIVE FACTS (Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 
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attempted to impose a carbon tax on airlines flying into the EU.47 
Developed countries, such as the U.S. and the EU member-states, are 
concerned that unless imports are included in emissions restrictions, many 
industries beneficial to their economies will relocate to avoid internalizing 
the cost of their emissions.48 This difference between Annex I and II 
countries convinced the U.S. to not sign the treaty, as the U.S. noted that 
developing countries, such as China, would not be subject to emissions 
limits, and American industry would be unfairly burdened, resulting in 
companies’ relocation to countries with no emissions limits.49 
 
3. The United States 
 
 The second highest emitter of carbon dioxide is the U.S.50 Similar 
to China’s involvement in the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. signed the 
agreement but did not ratify it, and has therefore been exempt from the 
emission regulation benchmarks.51 The U.S., due in large part to the 
economic recession, however, was able to reduce its CO2 emissions level 
below the Kyoto Protocol benchmark.52 Despite this encouraging trend, the 
U.S. has never adopted any form of GHG emission reducing legislation.53 
                                                                                                                                         
2009, available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/files/ACESLegFS.pdf (delineating 
the basic provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 47. See EU Ready to Compromise Over Airline Carbon Tax: EU Sources, 
EUBUSINESS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/transport-aviation.qdb 
(explaining that the EU was willing to compromise on the attempt to tax airlines in exchange 
for action from other leading countries) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 48. See Don C. Brunell, U.S. Regulators Shipping Jobs Overseas, WASHINGTON 
BUSINESS MAGAZINE, Fall 2013 (arguing that U.S. jobs and environmental protections will 
be lost as companies shift production to facilities in countries with less strict emissions 
standards) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 49. See JANE A. LEGGET ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34659, CHINA’S 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND MITIGATION POLICIES 25 (Sept. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34659.pdf (describing China as a non-Annex I country 
and stating that it therefore did not have binding emissions limits from 2008 until 2012). 
 50. See International Energy Statistics, supra note 25, at 44–57 (listing carbon 
emissions data from all countries). 
 51. See Jon Havi, Detlef Sprinz & Guri Bang, Why the United States Did Not Become 
a Party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and U.S. Perspectives, 18 EURO. J. 
INT’L RELATIONS 130, 133 (2012) (explaining that the United States did not become a party 
to the protocol after the Senate failed to ratify the Protocol and after President Bush’s 
repudiation of it). 
 52. See Allan LeBlanc, Is The U.S. About to Accidently Meet the Kyoto Protocol 
Targets?, BERKELEY ENERGY & RES. COLLAB. (Sept. 4, 2012), http://berc.berkeley.edu/is-
the-us-about-to-accidentally-meet-kyoto-protocol-targets/ (stating that the United States, 
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Cap-and-trade programs are often the leading proposals when governments 
look to limit GHG emissions, and the United States has entertained the idea 
of a cap-and-trade system.54 The American Clean Energy and Security Act, 
also known as the Waxman-Markey bill, was the most recent cap-and-trade 
proposal.55 The bill, designed to lower carbon emissions and create clean 
energy jobs, was approved by the House of Representatives, but was voted 
down in the Senate in 2009.56 The United States Congress has yet to pass 
any legislation that would mitigate carbon emissions.57 
 During his June 2013 environmental policy speech, President 
Obama outlined a series of initiatives that would continue to move the U.S. 
closer to implementing a holistic market-based climate change policy.58 The 
President vowed his administration’s continued support to lower GHG 
emissions below 2005 levels by seventeen percent.59 He also announced a 
series of new federal measures to reduce the nation’s impact on global 
climate change.60 These new initiatives include allowing the EPA to 
complete pollution standards for new and existing power plants, directing 
the Interior Department to allow public lands to be reserved for new 
renewable energy facilities to be built, increasing the federal government’s 
exclusive use of renewable sources of energy, and encouraging negotiations 
with other nations to allow free trade of environmental goods and 
services.61 President Obama also encouraged lawmakers to work together to 
                                                                                                                                         
though late, has reached emissions levels below the 1990 levels required by the Kyoto 
Protocol) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 53. See Michael Wines, E.P.A. Is Expected to Set Limits on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions by New Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, at A12 (stating that the EPA 
was taking its first-ever steps to reduce GHGs from new power plants). 
 54. See Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade, SMITHSONIAN MAG., 
Aug. 2009 (explaining the development of the United States’ proposals for cap-and-trade 
systems). 
 55. See generally Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 46 (noting that the 
legislation was passed by the House of Representatives in 2009). 
 56. See H.R. 2454 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, OPEN CONG., 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/actions_votes (last visited May 5, 2014) 
(providing the U.S. House of Representatives votes for and against  the bill) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 57. See Townshend & Frankhauser, supra note 9, at 430 (stating that the United States 
has failed to pass legislation and instead attempts to regulate under the guise of the Clean Air 
Act). 
 58. See President Obama, supra note 2 (advocating for a bi-partisan, market-based 
solution to climate change). 
 59. See id. (addressing the goal that the President established the year he took office). 
 60. See id. (directing agencies like the EPA to develop standards to mitigate 
emissions). 
 61. See id. (outlining specific suggestions for agency action). 
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create a market-based GHG emission reduction system that the U.S. could 
implement in the near future.62 
 
4. The European Union 
 
 This uncertainty among legislatures around the world will likely 
only be exacerbated by the recent news that Europe’s flagship climate 
change initiative, the European Union’s Environmental Trading System 
(EU-ETS), has failed to live up to its potential.63 The program has been 
mired in economic inefficiency and plagued by unrealized environmental 
goals since its inception in 2005.64 The EU-ETS is a cap-and-trade program 
designed to restrict carbon dioxide emissions in certain industries 
throughout much of Europe.65 These industries include refineries, 
combustion-related facilities, iron and steel factories, cement plants, and 
electricity providers.66 The goal of the cap-and-trade program was to create 
and maintain a market for carbon that would encourage investment into 
new low-emission technologies.67 The legislation was hailed as a huge 
victory for proponents of climate change mitigation when it was 
implemented, and the world waited to see if the first large emissions trading 
scheme would prove successful.68 Unfortunately, eight years into the 
program, many Members of European Parliament (MEPs) appear ready to 
                                                                                                                                         
 62. See id. (stating that the President would be willing to work with both Democrats 
and Republicans to enact legislation and regulations to mitigate the impact of emissions). 
 63. See RICARDO COELHO, TAMRA GILBERA & JOANNA CABELLO, CARBON TRADE 
WATCH, GREEN IS THE COLOR OF MONEY: THE EU ETS FAILED MODEL FOR THE “GREEN 
ECONOMY” 2 (2013) available at http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/p 
ublications/EU-ETS_Report-web.pdf (explaining that the EU-ETS has failed to meet its 
objectives) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 64. See Anna Petherick, Holding Out Hope, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 534, 534–35 
(2013) (discussing the difficulties the EU-ETS program). 
 65. See COELHO ET AL., supra note 63, at 3 (explaining the EU-ETS cap-and-trade 
model). 
 66. See generally Julien Chevallier, Banking and Borrowing in the EU ETS: A Review 
of Economic Modelling, Current Provisions and Prospects for Future Design, 26 J. ECON. 
SURVEYS 158 (2012) (describing the types of facilities affected by the EU-ETS). 
 67. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 35 (2008), 
available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf 
(describing the goal of creating a marketplace that would facilitate cuts in emissions to meet 
the Kyoto Protocol requirements) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 68. See Helena Spongenberg, EU’s Carbon Trading Scheme Hailed as Success, 
EUOBSERVER (May 29, 2007, 9:17 AM), http://euobserver.com/economic/24145 (noting that 
the EU-ETS was seen as a remarkable success despite challenges and concerns) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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abandon the EU-ETS.69 On April 16, 2003, the European Parliament 
rejected a measure that would have back-loaded future carbon emissions 
allowances, a measure that some say could have bolstered the faltering 
program.70 Because of the vote, the program’s carbon market price for 
allowances fell to new lows.71 
 Part II of this article analyzes the EU-ETS system of carbon 
regulation using the cap-and-trade system to determine why it has not 
produced the results the EU expected. Part III provides an alternative 
approach to climate change legislation by discussing a carbon tax approach. 
Part IV details the benefits and results of a modified carbon taxation 
program that incorporates reinvestment. Part V summarizes why the EU 
should abandon the ETS in favor of a carbon tax with reinvestment. 
 
II. EU-ETS (Cap-and-Trade) 
A. What is Cap-and-Trade? 
 
 In a cap-and-trade program, a legislative body appoints a 
governmental agency to establish a maximum amount, or cap, on carbon 
emissions from certain carbon polluting parties.72 These selected carbon 
polluters are then required to lower their GHG emissions below the cap.73 
To encourage compliance and minimize initial costs, these parties are given 
allowances to emit carbon, and should they fall below their cap, they can 
trade or sell these allowances to others.74 Those who are not able to limit 
their GHG emissions under the cap are then able to purchase these leftover 
allowances.75 In this manner, the cap-and-trade system creates a market 
among carbon polluters, and the availability and demand in trading for the 
allowances dictates their value and price of emissions—in this case, CO2—
by the ton.76 The cap-and-trade system is designed to reduce GHG 
emissions by making it more economically viable for carbon polluters to 
develop and invest in new processes to mitigate or collect emissions, move 
                                                                                                                                         
 69. See ETS RIP?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013 (“It [the ETS] may well become an 
example of what not to do . . . .”). 
 70. See id. (stating that the EU vote was 334 in favor of rejecting the proposal, to 315 
against rejecting the proposal). 
 71. See id. (explaining the effect of the vote rejecting the proposal). 
 72. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Effect of Allowance Allocations on 
Cap-and-Trade System Performance, 54 J.L. & ECON. S267, S270 (2011) (explaining that the 
government sets the overall emissions cap and can determine which firms are exempt). 
 73. See id. at S268 (describing how cap-and-trade systems function). 
 74. See id. at S270 (explaining the system of credit allocation). 
 75. See id. (explaining the options given to firms who exceed the cap). 
 76. See id. (describing the impact of the cap and trade system on market prices). 
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toward cleaner forms of energy and encourage consumers to use energy 
more efficiently due to rising costs.77 
 
1. Advantages of Cap-and-Trade 
 
 There are a number of unique advantages to a cap-and-trade 
program that help lower GHG emissions. Politicians often favor this 
program because cap-and-trade is not a “tax,” and the government has 
control over allocating the emissions allowances.78 Some environmentalists 
have rallied behind the cap-and-trade method because it establishes a clear 
quantity restriction on carbon polluters.79 In addition, many industry groups 
support cap-and-trade programs because of their inherent money-making 
potential.80 All supporters of cap-and-trade programs believe two 
assumptions about the program: (1) Carbon emissions below a certain level 
(that designated by the cap, or its ultimate goal) do not cause undue harm to 
the environment, and (2) a market in trading pollution allowances is “the 
most cost-effective means of reducing pollution to the predetermined 






 77. See id. at S276 (finding that lower prices encourage a reliance on energy efficient 
emissions technology). 
 78 . See Robert Hahn & Robert Stavins, Why Cap-and-Trade Should (and Does) Have 
Appeal to Politicians, VOX (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/article/why-cap-and-
trade-should-and-does-have-appeal-politicians (“The political appeal of cap-and-trade can be 
explained, in part, by the fact that politicians can fiddle with the initial distribution of 
property rights . . . without affecting the final equilibrium . . . .”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF CLIMATE, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 79. See Robert F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and 
Find our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10118, 10120 (Feb. 2009) 
(discussing politicians’, economists’, and environmentalists’ reasons for favoring a cap-and-
trade approach to climate mitigation); see also Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with 
Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 587 (2013) 
(“Environmentalists favor this system for the absolute quantity restrictions on carbon 
emissions.”). 
 80. See J.R. Deshazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1540–46 (2007) (discussing the reasons 
that industry groups and environmentalists both favor a cap and trade system); see also U.S. 
CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 6 (2009), available 
at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf (advocating for industry groups and 
environmentalists to establish a legislative framework to address climate change) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 81. See Mann, supra note 79, at 10120 (2009) (detailing the assumptions underlining 
support for cap-and-trade). 
CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT 369 
2. Disadvantages to Cap-and-Trade 
 
 There are also disadvantages to approaching the problem of climate 
change through a cap and trade system. Determining a baseline amount of 
emission reduction targets, the allocation of allowances, and the use of 
offsets, often slows down cap-and-trade programs.82 Thus, the period of 
adoption of a cap-and-trade program and its implementation is often 
lengthy.83 There is also no certainty of the price required to achieve the 
promised reduction levels defined by the emissions cap.84 Cap-and-trade 
programs require constant monitoring, the balancing of many factors, and 
history has shown the U.S. that carbon markets experience volatile, often 
unforeseen, price shifts.85 If the price of carbon is too high, there will be 
pressure to relax the cap.86 Yet, when the cap is relaxed too much, the 
carbon market itself is decimated.87 
 Perhaps more important than all of the drawbacks elicited above is 
the fact that a cap-and-trade system does not guarantee a reduction in GHG 
emissions, defeating the purpose of enacting such a scheme. Cap-and-trade 
requires certainty about the demand for emissions, and that those 
regulations are regulated precisely.88 An effective cap-and-trade program 
requires that all emission allowances be auctioned off.89 If, however, there 
is any uncertainty in the demand for emissions, or if problems arise while 
regulating the emissions permits, the cap-and-trade program becomes 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. See Edward Nell & Armon Rezai, Economic Growth and Climate Change: Cap-
and-Trade or Emission Tax? 9–11 (Schwartz Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Analysis Working Paper 
No. 2009-4, Feb. 2009) (explaining the drawbacks of a cap-and-trade system) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF CLIMATE, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 83. See id. at 2 (estimating the time required for implementation). 
 84. See id. at 11 (“The high volatility on the return, due to the tremendous fluctuations 
of the emission price, poses considerable uncertainty for firms in their investment 
decisions.”). 
 85. See Julien Chevallier et al., Options Introduction and Volatility in the EU ETS, 33 
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECON. 855, 873 (2011) (explaining the uncertain nature of 
predicting the behavior of carbon markets). 
 86. See id. at 863 (“These asymmetries reflect the hedging strategies constructed by 
market agents to reduce the risk of their position with regard to high/low carbon price 
changes.”). 
 87. See id. at 873 (“Because options enable a more complete and liquid market, and a 
greater flexibility for market participants to hedge their position on the carbon market, they 
seem to have a significant impact on the level of volatility in the futures market.”). 
 88. See Philip I. Levy, The Carbon Tax/Cap-and-Trade Royal Rumble, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (May 13, 2009), http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/13/the 
_carbon_taxcap_and_trade_royal_rumble (“Cap-and-trade can do a very good impersonation 
of a carbon tax when we know the demand for emissions with certainty, when we do a great 
job of regulation, and when we auction off all the emissions permits.”). 
 89. See id. (explaining the cap-and-trade auctioning system). 
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unstable and unworkable.90 Furthermore, if the dispersal of permits is 
obstructed by political interference, the viability of cap-and-trade programs 
is further weakened.91 
 Cap-and-trade programs, while rudimentary on their face, are 
somewhat complex in their implementation. They rely on (hopefully) 
identifying low carbon technologies for cost management in emissions 
reductions.92 The objective is that price signals provided by caps extending 
decades into the future will incentivize the development and use of these 
low carbon technologies.93 This is a key assumption to the hoped-for lower 
future costs of achieving those reductions set by the decreasing cap. Due to 
the inherent uncertainty of those ideas, however, supplementary policies are 
necessary to assure further governmental funding and increased incentives 
for private funding in research and development.94 These policies take the 
form of multi-year compliance periods, banking and borrowing provisions, 
a cost containment mechanism to prevent extreme pricing, and the 
availability of offsets for carbon capture and sequestration.95 
 The message cap-and-trade programs send to carbon polluters can 
also be confusing regarding emissions reduction,96 even though the end goal 
of a cap-and-trade program is to reduce GHG emissions.97 These programs 
propose to reach that goal by requiring polluters to purchase the right to 
pollute or use permits to pollute for free.98 In both instances, the 
government in essence gives permission to carbon polluters to continue 
                                                                                                                                         
 90. See id. (describing the volatile and unreliable nature of the cap-and-trade system 
because of their reliance on unpredictable factors). 
 91. See id. (“[I]f politics intrudes into the process of handing out emissions permits, 
then the two approaches [cap-and-trade and carbon taxes] veer apart.”). 
 92. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 78, at 3 (outlining the underlying principles of a 
cap-and-trade system). 
 93. See Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. 
Cap-and-Trade System, 24 OXF. REV. ECON. POLICY 298, 299 (2008) (outlining the desired 
effect of a successful cap-and-trade system). 
 94. See id. at 300 (“[A] cap-and-trade system alone will not encourage the socially 
desirable level of investment in research, development, and deployment of new technologies 
that could reduce future emission-reduction costs.”). 
 95. See id. at 303 (evaluating additional incentive plans to encourage emission 
reduction). 
 96. See David Driesen, Capping Carbon 36 (Syracuse Univ. Coll. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 31, 2009) (“Trading does not solve any of the key problems hindering effective 
cap setting, so while it proves useful in reducing costs, it does nothing to improve on 
traditional approaches in solving environmental problems.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 97. See id. (explaining the desired purpose of the cap-and-trade system). 
 98. See Reuven Avi-Yonah & David Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: 
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5 (2009) (describing the ambiguous message of cap-and-trade as “the 
government permit[ting] you to pollute as long as you are willing to pay”). 
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polluting. This “right to pollute” notion that cap-and-trade sends to 
polluters, however, may not be in tune with society’s desire to reducing 
GHG emissions.99 Even though wording GHG reduction programs as a 
“tax” may make the programs less likely to pass through the political 
process, the term sends the message that emitting high levels of carbon is 
the legislation’s target. 
 
B. The EU-ETS and Why it Has Proven Ineffective 
1. Inception of the EU-ETS 
 
 The EU-ETS is the largest and most influential GHG emission 
reduction program in the world, comprising every nation in the European 
Union along with Croatia, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.100 Since its 
inception, it has failed to live up to expectations.101 With the European 
Parliament rejection of a back-loading attempt to strengthen the faltering 
cap-and-trade market for emission allowances, the carbon trading 
behemoth’s days may be numbered. With the ever-growing need for 
comprehensive carbon emission regulation facing legislatures around the 
world, the question becomes, what should we do now? It is crucial to 
understand why the EU-ETS is failing, and what changes must be adopted 
in order to avoid making the same mistakes again. 
 The EU-ETS came from very humble beginnings, and can be said 
to be an amalgam of two other failed climate change initiatives.102 The 
sapling that grew into the largest cap-and-trade system of its kind resembles 
both a failed attempt by the European Commission to install a carbon tax in 
the 1990s, and the Commission’s failed attempt to reject flexible trading 
principles set forth in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.103 The EU-ETS was 
eventually implemented in 2005 and was split into phases designed to allow 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. See Petherick, supra note 64, at 595 (explaining negative social impacts of cap-
and-trade). 
 100. See EU ETS 2005–2012, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) 
(describing the history and evolution of the EU ETS and its membership) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 101. See Petherick, supra note 64, at 595 (noting the failures of the EU-ETS). 
 102. Frank J. Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 ENVTL. RES. ECON. 
392, 392 (2009) (“The sapling that became EU-ETS was a product of two failures; first, the 
European Commission failed in its initiative to introduce an effective EU-wide carbon 
energy tax in the nineties. Secondly, the Commission fought unsuccessfully against the 
inclusion of trading as a flexible instrument in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.”). 
 103. See id. at 392 (noting the EU-ETS’s failure to satisfy the requirements of the 
Kyoto Protocol). 
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changes to the program over time.104 The first phase, sometimes referred to 
as the pilot phase, ran from January 2005 to December 2007 and was 
designed to be a feeling-out process in which the ETS allocated allowances 
freely.105 The EU described the first stage as a “learning by doing phase.”106 
Fifteen member states of the EU initially adopted the program, 
incorporating around 12,000 carbon polluters from many different 
industries.107 During 2005, the ETS traded 260 million tons of CO2.
108 
 During the following year, the price of the allowances rose to 
approximately thirty Euros per ton of carbon dioxide, representing the 
highest level an allowance for carbon has been traded in the ETS 
program.109 Then, a handful of EU countries confirmed that their actual 
emissions were less than the number of allowances allocated to them, 
resulting in the price of allowances plunging fifty-four percent in one 
week.110 The EU had inadvertently over-allocated allowances to the 
emitters and the lack of scarcity continued to push the price of allowances 
down.111 By 2007, the price of allowances in the ETS was almost zero, 
which in turn obliterated the incentive for the targeted polluters to continue 
to limit their GHG emissions.112 The overabundance was caused by the EU 
allocating too many allowances, and by the fact that during the first few 
years of the program, polluters lowered their carbon emissions, so they did 
not need as many additional allowances.113 In the first phase of the EU-
ETS, carbon emissions actually rose by 0.68%.114 
                                                                                                                                         
 104. See C. Böhringer & A. Lange, European Union’s Emissions Trading System, 3 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCE & ENVTL. ECON., 155–60 (2013) (describing the 
origins of the EU-ETS). 
 105. See id. at 156 (detailing the early phases of the program). 
 106. See Marjan Peeters & Stefan Weishaar, Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS: 
“Learning by Doing” Continues Beyond 2012, 2009 CARBON AND CLIMATE L. REV. 88, 91 
(2009) (explaining the early uncertainties of the EU-ETS). 
 107. See Yue-Jun Zhang & Yi-Ming Wei, An Overview of Current Research on EU 
ETS: Evidence from Its Operating Mechanism and Economic Effect, 87 APP. ENERGY 1805, 
1807 (2010) (detailing the early impacts of the EU-ETS). 
 108. See id. (stating the amount of carbon credits that the EU-ETS traded in 2005). 
 109. See Beat Hintermann, Allowance Price Drivers in the First Phase of the EU ETS, 
59 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 43, 48 (2010) (“The price [of allowances] increased from 
around €7 in January 2005 to above €30 in April 2006 before crashing to below €10 within 
three days.”). 
 110. See id. (explaining trends in allowances for cap-and-trade). 
 111. See id. (describing imprecise allocation of allowances that frustrated the purpose 
of the program). 
 112. See id. (noting the failure of allowances to incentivize carbon polluters to reduce 
their emissions). 
 113. See Simon Caney & Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: Unethical Unjust and 
Ineffective 31 (Centre for Climate Change Econ. and Pol’y Working Paper No. 49, June 
2011), available at http://www.cccep.ac.uk/Publications/Working-papers/Papers/50-
59/WP59_carbon-trading-caney-hepburn.pdf (“[F]irms actually reduced their emissions in 
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2. Impact of the EU-ETS on Aviation 
 
 An expansion of the scope of the program, and a desire to 
incorporate aviation emissions underscored the second phase of the EU-
ETS.115 The program began including aviation emissions in 2008.116 All 
flights to or from airports in the ETS countries, no matter the carrier 
nationality, would be required to obtain allowances to cover CO2 
emissions.117 This was Europe’s attempt to create a Border Tax Adjustment 
(BTA) by selecting the aviation industry as the first to try this scheme.118 
The European Committee believed that this additional industry of polluters 
would increase the scarcity of the allowances by creating more demand for 
said allowances, while making a larger impact on lowering carbon 
emissions in the transportation sector.119 Some foreign governments and 
airlines argued “that the EU-ETS in its current form is both unjustly 
harmful to airlines” and works to effectively nullify previous treaties.120 
Most notably, the U.S. and China opposed the expansion of the EU-ETS 
into aviation emissions.121 The U.S. even went so far as to pass anti-ETS 
legislation called the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
                                                                                                                                         
the first two years of the phase, motivated by high prices in the 2005 and 2006 period, so 
that they didn’t need as many allowances in 2007. Second, regulators handed out too many 
EUAs in the first place.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 114. See Press Release, European Commission, Emissions Trading: 2007 Verified 
Emissions from EU ETS Businesses (May 23, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-787_en.htm?locale=en (highlighting the net 
increase in carbon emissions during the preliminary phase of the program) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 115. See Robert Malina, The Impact of the European Union Trading Scheme on U.S. 
Aviation, 19 J. OF AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 36, 36 (2012) (stating that in 2008 the emissions 
trading scheme was expanded to include air travel). 
 116. See Annela Anger & Jonathan Köhler, Including Aviation Emissions in the EU 
ETS: Much Ado About Nothing?, 17 TRANSP. POL. 38, 39 (2010) (discussing the 
implementation of the EU-ETS pursuant to the EU’s adoption of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 117. See id. at 39 (noting that the program includes all international flights, unlike the 
Kyoto Protocol, which only tracked domestic flights). 
 118. See Robert Ireland, The EU Emissions Policy and Border Tax Adjustments 3 
(World Customs Organization Research Paper No. 26, 2012) (discussing the analogy 
between the European Union’s aviation emissions policy and carbon border tax adjustments) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 119. See Anger & Köhler, supra note 116, at 42 (noting that more efficient airlines that 
release fewer emissions incur lower costs). 
 120. Malina, supra note 115, at 36. 
 121. See id. at 36 (stating that both the United States and China have requested 
exemptions). 
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Prohibition Act of 2011.122 In response, the EU included an exemption 
clause.123 
 
3. Recent EU-ETS Developments 
 
 Phase I of the EU-ETS implementation saw another issue with an 
over-allocation of allowances causing the price of those allowances to fall 
again.124 One factor for the fall in the allowance prices is that the European 
nations as well as most of the developed world suffered a recession in 
2008.125 This resulted in corporations and citizens using less energy, and as 
a result, carbon polluters lowered their output, creating less need for 
allowances.126 During Phase II, the price for allowances plummeted further, 
diminishing the incentive polluters had to reduce their GHG emissions.127 
By the time the EU voted against a proposal to withhold some 900 million 
future-dated allowances in January 2013, the price for an allowance of one 
ton of carbon fell to under three Euros.128 As more countries joined the EU-
ETS during the second phase from 2008 to 2012, the program looked to 
begin incorporating national emissions registries into one EU registry.129 
                                                                                                                                         
 122. See European Union Emission Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-200, 126 Stat. 1477 (prohibiting civil aircrafts from the United States from 
participating in the EU-ETS). 
 123. See Malina, supra note 115, at 36 (“Under current EU legislation, an exemption 
may be granted for airlines from countries that implement measures ‘equivalent’ to those in 
the EU to reduce GHG emissions.”). 
 124. See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 6 (displaying data that documents the price 
decline, and discussing the possibility that over-allocation may have been part of the reason 
that aggregate emissions were below total allocations). 
 125. See COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MEETING CARBON BUDGETS—THE NEED 
FOR A STEP CHANGE: PROGRESS REPORT TO PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
34 (2009), available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document 
/other/9789999100076/9789999100076.pdf [hereinafter MEETING CARBON BUDGETS] 
(stating that the recession caused the price of carbon to fall) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 126. See id. at 67 (noting that the recession has impacted energy-intensive industries 
and that emissions have thus fallen, so there is less emissions reduction effort needed to meet 
the cap). 
 127. See id. at 68 (presenting data that shows that the price of allowances declined 
during Phase II). 
 128. See ETS RIP?, supra note 69 (presenting data showing the decline in price for a 
carbon allowance from approximately twenty euros in 2010 to less than three euros in 2013). 
 129. See Prajakt Samant & Simone Goligorsky, EU Emissions Trading System Single 
Registry: Timetable Announced, NAT’L. L. REV. (May 14, 2012), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/eu-emissions-trading-system-single-registry-timetable-
announced (stating that the European Commission announced a single registry with the 
purpose of incorporating the national emissions registries into a single location) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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 Now in Phase III, running from 2013 to 2020, the EU-ETS is 
focusing on switching from allocating allowances, to auctioning them 
off.130 The program will also look to incorporate Australia’s carbon trading 
system to make both systems compatible with one another.131 The last 
phase, Phase IV, slated for 2021–2028, could look to increase the rate at 
which the cap is decreased each year.132 
 According to the UBS Investment Research, the EU-ETS cost $287 
billion through 2011 and had “almost zero impact” on the volume of overall 
emissions of the EU.133 If that same amount of money had been used to 
upgrade power plants, or in another targeted way, it could have lowered 
emissions in the EU by forty-three percent.134 
 
4. Why the EU-ETS is Failing 
 
 Over the course of its eight-year lifespan, the EU-ETS has 
struggled to maintain viability throughout Europe, due to a number of 
factors that have led this system to be inefficient.135 First and foremost, as 
                                                                                                                                         
 130. See Tim Laing, Assessing the Effectiveness of the European Union Emissions 
Trading System 22 (Ctr. for Climate Change Econ. and Pol. Working Paper No. 126, 2013), 
available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/WorkingPa 
pers/Papers/100-109/WP106-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-system.pdf (“Phase II 
allocation plans have made a move away from free allowance allocation, with all power 
generation installations in the UK required to buy their permits in auction. The EU ETS as a 
whole is moving in this direction and will move away from free allocation in the power 
sector, virtually completely, by Phase III.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 131. See The EU Emissions Trading System, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (“The 
European Commission has agreed in principle to link the ETS with Australia’s system in 
stages from mid-2015.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 132. See 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (stating that 
the rate has to be increased to forty percent of 1990 levels by 2030) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 133. See Sid Maher, Europe’s $287bn Carbon “Waste:” UBS Report, THE AUSTRALIAN 
(Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/europes-287bn-carbon-
waste-ubs-report/story-fn59niix-1226203068972# (“UBS says the European Union’s 
emissions trading scheme has cost the continent’s consumers $287 billion for “almost zero 
impact” on cutting carbon emissions . . . .”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 134. See id. (“In a damning report to clients, UBS Investment Research said that had 
the €210bn the European ETS had cost consumers been used in a targeted approach to 
replace the EU’s dirtiest power plants, emissions could have been reduced by 43% . . . .”). 
 135. See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 29 (finding that the main problem was 
inefficiency, led by failures in equality of price allowance and marginal abatement costs). 
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detailed above, there was a vast over-allocation of allowances in both Phase 
I and Phase II of the program.136 This over-allocation clearly illuminates the 
difficulties inherent when a regulator attempts to set a carbon emissions cap 
that is both workable and sustainable.137 There will always be imperfections 
in a cap because there is no way to predict the future of a national economy, 
much less dozens of them.138 The allocation process was also flawed in that 
it effectively rewarded the worst emitters.139 Allocations were awarded 
based on the historical emission levels for the targeted emitters.140 In 
function, this gave the most advantage to the continent’s worst GHG 
emitters.141 In addition, it was very difficult to predict how a given country 
would react to the implementation of the EU-ETS. Many targeted emitters 
in the scheme were able to successfully reduce emissions below the initial 
cap.142 This led to countries seeing a reduction in the amount of carbon 
emissions they were producing.143 While this is obviously a positive change 
toward the end goal of lowering carbon emissions, it also exacerbated the 
issue the EU-ETS created when it over-allocated the emissions 
allowances.144 In correlation with this two-fold issue of over-allocation, the 
price of the allowances dropped due to the most basic principles of supply 
and demand.145 There was simply no demand for the high supply of 
allowances that the EU-ETS had allocated to the various targeted 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. See id. at 2 (stating that the price crashed after the first round of emissions 
verifications and after Phase II showing that the markets were over-allocated). 
 137. See id. (discussing how difficult it is to find the specific reasons for the allowance 
price movement, which still confounds market analysts and economists). 
 138. See id. (implying that there will always be imperfections in the cap due to the 
inability to predict how the market will move the price, as the underlying reasons are still 
unknown). 
 139. See COELHO, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that the first two phases allocated free 
permits according to historical emissions, which effectively served as a subsidy for the 
biggest polluters). 
 140. See id. (“In the first phase, from 2005 to 2007, free permits were allocated 
according to historical emissions.”). 
 141. See id. (stating that the historical emissions policy had a tendency to benefit the 
biggest polluters). 
 142. See Press Release, supra note 114 (providing data regarding emissions reductions). 
 143. See id. (illustrating that several countries, including Belgium, France, Portugal, 
and Sweden, reduced the amount of carbon emissions that they were emitting). 
 144. See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 6 (stating that over-abatement and over-
allocation was such a problem because of the much lower actual emissions). 
 145. See Reem Heakal, Economics Basics: Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 
2014) (defining the relationship between supply and price: as supply increases, price 
decreases) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
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emitters.146 This factor, more than any other, has plagued the cap-and-trade 
system because it has given emitters no economic incentive to lower their 
carbon emissions. 
 The economic recession is also causing problems for the EU-ETS 
market, as a recession reduces the need for emission permits, as actual 
output is lower than the scheme’s projections that dictate the availability of 
emission permits.147 The 2008 banking (and oil)148 recession, which 
severely affected the economic foundation of the several EU countries 
(leading to bailouts)149 as well as the world economy, created a large drop 
in the amount of energy that nations used.150 Three “main determinants” 
influence the level of emissions in an economy: the demand for electricity, 
the price of carbon dioxide, and fuel prices.151 Power plants release 
significant emissions used by commercial, residential, and industrial 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 6 (arguing that there was no demand for 
allowances because the actual emissions were substantially less than the allocations 
provided). 
 147. See MEETING CARBON BUDGETS, supra note 125, at 2 (noting that the biggest 
challenge for cap-and-trade programs is the economic environment, as economic conditions 
will have major implications for the path of emissions). 
 148. See Maximilian A. Staedtler, Crude Oil Prices, WHAT MATTERS, 
http://economatters.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/what-matters-crude-oil-price-chart.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2014) (displaying the drop in oil prices before and after the 2008 recession) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT); see also Sam Montana, What Caused the Great Recession of 2008–2009?, 
KNOJI, http://economics-the-economy.knoji.com/what-caused-the-great-recession-of-
20082009/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (discussing how the 2008 recession is referred to as 
the banking or housing recession due to the housing price boom and lax lending standards) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT); Tom Therramus, Oil Caused Recession, Not Wall Street, OIL-PRICE.NET, 
http://oil-price.net/en/articles/oil-caused-recession-not-wallstreet.php (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014) (arguing that the crisis was exacerbated because the price of oil climbed from $10 a 
barrel in 1998 to $147 a barrel by the summer of 2008 and that the rapid rise in energy prices 
reduced economic demand and made homeownership difficult for many as transportation 
costs soared) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 149. See Cyprus Becomes Fifth Country To Seek Bailout, DEUTCHE WELLE, 
http://www.dw.de/cyprus-becomes-fifth-country-to-seek-bailout/a-16049277 (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014) (stating that several European countries have been bailed out due to the 
severe recession, including Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal, which has 
distracted the EU from its goal of leading the world to lower levels of emissions) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 150. See Bruno Declercq, Erik Delarue & William D’haeseleer, Impact of the Economic 
Recession on the European Power Sector’s CO2 Emissions, 39 ENERGY POLICY 1, 11–12 
(“The total difference in emissions of the simulated European power sector during [2008 and 
2009] amounts to 175 Mton.”). 
 151. See id. at 1 (examining “the impact of the economic recession on CO2 emissions in 
the European power sector”). 
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buildings.152 Typically, building and utility sectors account for around 
sixty-three percent of an economy's total emissions.153 As the recession 
reduced the demand for electricity because consumers had to save money 
(high unemployment and financial crises along with corporations going 
bankrupt), the level of carbon emissions declined significantly among 
power sector facilities.154 While the lowering of carbon emissions from the 
power sector is a good result for the environment and public health, it 
exacerbated the over-allocation issue that was disintegrating the carbon 
trading market in the EU-ETS.155 
This global economic phenomenon was not something designed 
into the ETS system, and because it was beyond the ETS system’s control 
and required multiple countries to vote to change the rules, a quick response 
was near impossible.156 This recession highlighted a key problem with cap-
and-trade systems using this type of market-based carbon reduction 
strategy: external pressures on the carbon market can further cripple cap-
and-trade systems, which rely on stability and are not readily adaptable to 
extreme market forces.157 In a cap-and-trade approach, as goes the 
economic climate, so goes the effectiveness of the legislation.158 
 Lastly, the EU-ETS is failing because it is not creating the desired 
effect on its targeted emitters.159 The cap-and-trade legislation was first 
proposed because the EU believed carbon dioxide posed a serious threat to 
the nations making up the EU and to the rest of the world.160 The ETS was 
                                                                                                                                         
 152. See id. at 11 (describing a model based upon the significant emissions of power 
plants). 
 153. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) 
(stating that electricity creation comprises thirty-three percent, industry twenty percent, and 
real estate eleven percent of United States greenhouse emissions) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 154. See Bruno et al., supra note 150, at 2 (stating that the recession decreased demand 
for electricity). 
 155. See LUCAS MERRILL BROWN, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING 
SYSTEM: RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EU_ETS_Lessons_Learned_Report_EDF.pdf (stating 
that while firms invested in emission reductions, over-allocation was a serious problem) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 156. See id. at 27 (discussing the feasibility of quickly responding to phenomena by 
explaining rigorous regulations that each of the twenty-seven member states must adhere). 
 157. See id. at 5 (noting that commentators have argued that the reductions occurred 
because of the recession). 
 158. See id. (stating that the EU-ETS is based on other cap-and-trade systems, which 
tend to have faster and cheaper results). 
 159. See Frank Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 ENVTL. RES. 
ECON. 391, 392 (2009) (outlining a primary failure of the EU-ETS). 
 160. See id. (describing the reasoning behind the system). 
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designed to tackle the dangers of rapidly rising GHG emissions by creating 
an incentive for polluters to invest in energy efficiency and clean energy, 
while consumers reduced demand for carbon-intensive products and 
fuels.161 Yet due to the program allocating (and over-allocating) allowances 
instead of auctioning them, emitters had no incentive to change their 
habits.162 For all of the money, time, and resources used to implement this 
program, it has failed to reach the primary goal of its enactment.163 
 
5. Windfall Profits and Uneven Burdens 
 
 While proving inefficient in combatting carbon emissions and 
failing to establish a viable carbon market in all economic conditions, the 
EU-ETS has been biased, providing a distinct economic advantage to some 
of the players.164 A detailed analysis of the power sector under the EU-ETS 
shows that a significant portion of the costs of carbon emission allowance 
(whether allocated freely or auctioned) have been passed on to consumers, 
generating windfall profits for wholesale power producers in Europe.165 In 
essence, the EU-ETS has unintentionally worked to bolster the power 
industry’s profits throughout Europe.166 This realization further 
demonstrates just how ineffective the cap-and-trade approach has been at 
sending the correct message to emitters.167 Instead of rebuking the power 
industry for emitting carbon into the atmosphere by ensuring that it incurs 
economic penalties, the EU-ETS has instead allowed emitters to see record 
profits while ignoring the underlying purpose of the program altogether.168 
 While the power companies’ profits soared, electricity consumers 
throughout Europe have been forced to bear the burden of the program.169 
Studies show that electricity consumers have seen an increase in costs for 
                                                                                                                                         
 161. See id. at 395 (explaining the benefits and incentive structure of the EU-ETS). 
 162. See Coelho, supra note 63, at 6 (outlining why the EU-ETS has been so ineffective 
in reducing emissions). 
 163. See id. at 4 (noting that the EU-ETS did not achieve its intended goal). 
 164. See Wietze Lise et al., The Impact of the EU ETS on Prices, Profits and Emissions 
in the Power Sector: Simulation Results with the 47 COMPETES EU20 Model, 47 ENVTL. 
RES. ECON. 23, 24 (2010) (describing the unintended advantages of the EU-ETS). 
 165. See id. (explaining the unintended consequence of the carbon emission allowances 
under the EU-ETS). 
 166. See id. (noting the increased profits to an industry the regulations were supposed to 
discourage). 
 167. See id. (outlining how windfall profits undermine the purpose of an emissions 
reduction regime). 
 168. See id. (describing how the EU-ETS actually resulted in increased emissions). 
 169. See id. at 23 (stating that consumers, the intended beneficiaries of this system, are 
actually paying for the system). 
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using energy due to the trickledown effect of this approach.170 Rather than 
creating stability and certainty, the EU-ETS over the course of eight years 
has resulted in a fragile, unpredictable, inefficient, and unfair approach to 
reducing carbon emissions.171 
 
6. Carbon Leakage and the Need for Border Tax Adjustments 
 
 The EU’s competitiveness with other global economies has been 
impacted by carbon leakage, a by-product of the EU-ETS.172 Carbon 
leakage occurs when a developed country threatens or puts into effect 
restrictions on carbon emissions (cap-and-trade for example) and 
subsequently emission-dependent industries relocate to countries with no 
emissions restrictions.173 
 The emitter under restriction—here, industries based in the EU—
will need to increase the price of their goods to compensate for internalizing 
the cost of their emissions.174 A competitor, from China, the U.S., or 
another global economy, however, can keep its prices low (or add to 
profits) because it does not need to internalize the cost of its emissions by 
adhering to such a restriction.175 This leakage not only leads to an economic 
disadvantage for industries in regulated areas, but also undercuts the efforts 
of the reduction program by increasing emissions in non-regulated areas.176 
Anecdotal evidence shows this already occurred during the 1990s and 
2000s. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil led to the drafting 
of the Kyoto Protocol and called upon developed countries to reduce their 
GHG emissions.177 This seems to have led to rapid increases in foreign 
                                                                                                                                         
 170. See id. (verifying that the cost is being passed on to the intended beneficiaries 
through studies). 
 171. See id. (noting the negative results of the EU-ETS). 
 172. See Stephanie Monjon & Phillippe Quirion, A Border Adjustment for the EU ETS: 
Reconciling WTO Rules and Capacity to Tackle Carbon Leakage 3  (2012) (presented at the 
X Annual Conf. of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and Trade, Inter-American 
Development Bank, Milan, Italy, Oct. 19–20, 2012) (describing how border tax adjustments 
could revive the global competitiveness of the EU economy) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 173. See Glen P. Peters & Edgar G. Hertwich, Trading Kyoto, 2 NATURE REPORTS 40, 
40 (2008) (defining the process of carbon leakage). 
 174. See id. at 41 (describing the industry sales and cost structure under this regime). 
 175. See Kathy Baylis et al., Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon 
Policy 2 (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that economies that do not 
follow the regulations will reduce the regulated area’s competitiveness) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 176. See id. (describing the result in non-regulated jurisdictions). 
 177. See John M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental 
Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 12 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 149, 161 (2010) (outlining the Kyoto Protocol’s GHG reduction requirements). 
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direct investment (FDI) into developing countries with no emissions 
objectives or restrictions following these announcements.178 The result: 
rapidly rising emissions in developing countries.179 It appears that 
developed countries promising or actually capping emissions resulted in 
significant FDI into developing countries, allowing “nations to benefit from 
the omission to internalize environmental negativities could be both 
environmentally and economically counter-productive . . . [i]f mobile 
taxpaying industries relocate to pollution haven countries that offer little 
environmental regulation . . . .”180 
 In an effort to combat the problem of carbon leakage, many 
economists and environmentalists have suggested the implementation of 
Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs).181 These taxing mechanisms work to 
create a more even playing field by levying fees onto goods manufactured 
in countries without carbon emission measures, which are imported into an 
area that uses some form of carbon taxation.182 This strategy reduces or 
eliminates the advantage gained by emitters not operating under emission 
reduction implements.183 
 The EU-ETS does not incorporate a BTA strategy and the EU 
continues to be disadvantaged on the global economic stage.184 The reasons 
the European Commission has yet to enact a BTA program is likely tied to 
the difficulty in implementing such a program.185 The EU would need to 
determine the scope and extent to which the BTA would apply, and ensure 
that it satisfies the World Trade Organization’s rules.186 The EU’s 
reluctance could also be attributed to the fear that implementing a BTA 
would upset the fragile trading balance in the region.187 
                                                                                                                                         
 178. See id. at 164 (noting a loophole in which enterprises move to countries with few 
or no environmental restrictions). 
 179. See id. (explaining that the loophole actually leads to more GHG emissions in the 
unregulated countries). 
 180. Id. at 157–58. 
 181. See id. at 153 (explaining the economic and scientific justifications for BTAs over 
cap-and-trade programs). 
 182. See id. at 153–54 (describing how BTAs operate). 
 183. See id. at 152 (arguing that BTAs resolve the problems that have arisen under the 
EU-ETS). 
 184. See Frank Venmans, A Literature-Based Multi-Criteria Evaluation of the EU ETS, 
16 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 5493, 5498 (2012) (outlining the EU’s 
current regime and how it does not include a BTA strategy). 
 185. See id. (explaining one of the possible reasons why a BTA strategy has not been 
utilized). 
 186. See Monjon, supra note 172, at 2 (noting the potential for a BTA strategy to 
conflict with WTO rules). 
 187. See Venmans, supra note 184, at 5498 (describing a possible reason for not 
enacting a BTA policy). 
382 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 355 (2014) 
 
 Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether cap-and-trade is the 
best system or whether a carbon tax more efficiently reduces emissions for 
the EU?188 
 
III. Carbon Tax 
A. Carbon Tax at a Glance 
 
 With the struggles of the EU-ETS weighing heavily on the minds 
of legislatures around the world, the question becomes: is there a more 
effective way to enact climate change legislation?189 The most popular 
alternative to the cap-and-trade scheme is carbon taxation.190 A carbon tax 
is a tax levied on each ton of carbon dioxide emitted.191 Most of the 
literature recognizes the carbon tax as the most basic form of climate 
change regulation that aims to lower carbon emissions.192 As I have 
previously discussed, carbon emitters, be they consumers, producers, or 
distributers, create negative externalities in the form of pollution that affects 
every aspect of society.193 A carbon tax acts as an instrument that 
internalizes those negative externalities.194 Environmentally, a carbon tax 
implements the “polluter pays” principle, outlined in Principle 16 of the Rio 
Declaration.195 Economically, this internalization through carbon taxation 
                                                                                                                                         
 188. See Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax is Better than Cap and 
Trade 1257–62 (U. of Colo. Law School, Working Paper No. 09-18, Oct. 15, 2009) 
(outlining the differences between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system). 
 189. See id. (describing a more effective alternative to the EU-ETS). 
 190. See generally Levy, supra note 88 (explaining that carbon taxation is most 
attractive option other than the cap-and-trade system). 
 191. See Miles Young, Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an Effective Cap-
and-Trade Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 5 BYU L. REV. 1379, 1380 
(2009) (explaining how a carbon tax operates). 
 192. See Waggoner, supra note 188, at 1258 (outlining the basic nature of the carbon 
tax system). 
 193. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 3 (citing W.J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control 
of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (Oct. 1960)) (explaining that there are numerous negative consequences from 
carbon emissions). 
 194. See Duff, supra note 4, at 2069 (describing how a carbon tax would reduce the 
negative consequences currently associated with a cap-and-trade system). 
 195. See United Nations Conf. on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 16 U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (“[T]he polluter should, 
in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment.”). 
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creates a justifiable reason to impose the tax.196 In summary, a carbon tax 
mandates that whoever causes the pollution is responsible for bearing the 
costs of the harm the pollution creates, as well as the cost of minimizing 
future harm.197 
 Interestingly, many politicians do not support a carbon tax.198 As 
detailed above, this negativity likely stems from the unpopularity of 
anything called a tax.199 Carbon taxes, however, have many distinct benefits 
that should make the strategy appealing to both politicians and citizens 
alike.200 Carbon taxes ensure that products reflect their environmental 
impacts, advocate new environmental technologies, generate revenue, and 
concern a very limited implementation phase.201 Additionally, proponents 
of carbon taxes champion the advantages of the tax for its lack of 
interference with other regulatory systems, the unmistakable message the 
tax sends, and the price stability of carbon taxation.202 
 Carbon taxation proposals generally offer two directions for the 
revenue created by the revenue-neutral tax.203 The first is an equal 
dividends approach, where the revenues would be rebated directly to all 
residents of a particular country or region in equal portions.204 The second 
revenue direction, a taxation shift approach, takes each dollar of revenue 
and reduces the existing taxes by that amount.205 This approach could offset 
federal or state income taxes, payroll taxes, or sales (VAT) taxes.206 Both of 
these approaches return revenue to consumers and would make the public 
                                                                                                                                         
 196. See Duff, supra note 4, at 2069 (“[E]nvironmental taxation is typically justified as 
a way to internalize negative externalities, requiring economic actors to take the full costs of 
their behaviour into account when determining their actions.”). 
 197. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that future harm will be minimized if 
the carbon tax is implemented). 
 198. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 72, at 25 (stating that many legislatures have only 
enacted a cap-and-trade system). 
 199. See id. (describing the reasons why cap-and-trade systems have been embraced 
rather than carbon tax systems). 
 200. See Duff, supra note 4, at 2069 (noting the advantages of a carbon tax system). 
 201. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 7 (outlining specific benefits of a 
carbon tax). 
 202. See, e.g., Roberta Mann, To Tax or Not to Tax Carbon—Is That the Question?, 24 
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 44, 44 (2009) (describing the advantages of a carbon tax system over a 
cap-and-trade system). 
 203. See Pricing Carbon Efficiently and Equitably, CARBON TAX CTR., 
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction (last updated Sept. 17, 2013) (“Two primary return 
approaches are being discussed.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 204. See id. (discussing the equal dividends approach). 
 205. See id. (“In the other revenue return method, each dollar of carbon tax revenue 
would trigger a dollar’s worth of reduction in existing taxes . . . .”). 
 206. See id. (noting that federal payroll tax and state sales tax could be reduced under 
the plan). 
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more amenable to a carbon tax, and both approaches are generally designed 
to ensure that the tax does not become regressive.207 Unfortunately, much 
like cap-and-trade proposals, there is no assurance that the underlying goal 
of lowering carbon emissions will be served by these types of carbon taxes 
because they focus on consumers reducing their carbon consumption 
through new and improved technologies, energy efficiencies and cleaner 
power plants.208 
 Before the adoption of the EU-ETS, the EU proposed a carbon tax 
to be implemented broadly over Europe.209 However, many EU members 
viewed the broad taxation as a threat to national autonomy because tax 
authority is traditionally a sovereign right of individual countries.210 Similar 
arguments for autonomy would likely occur if similar mitigation efforts 
involving taxation were attempted in NAFTA211 or other economic or 
political unions. Every nation belonging to the EU, however, has some form 
of an energy tax.212 Additionally, the European Commission has issued 
directives recommending energy taxes that address global climate 
change.213 
 Carbon taxation has the potential to be more effective than the 
current EU-ETS cap-and-trade program currently in place; however, a 
carbon tax has many of the same drawbacks.214 The largest potential pitfall 
of a carbon tax is that while it provides price certainty, it does not guarantee 
that emissions will be reduced.215 Just like cap-and-trade systems, there are 
                                                                                                                                         
 207. See id. (explaining that equal dividends and taxation shift approaches are both 
progressive schemes and not regressive). 
 208. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 26 (discussing consumer choice in 
automobiles and the higher price of low emission vehicles as reasons why the increased 
production of more efficient cars might not immediately reduce emissions). 
 209. See Convery, supra note 159, at 392–93 (2009) (discussing the failure of the 1992 
EU-wide proposal). 
 210. See id. (discussing concerns that the tax would impede on  States’ autonomy to tax 
and manage their economies). 
 211. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, H.R. Doc. 
No. 103-159, 32 I.L.M. 289  (creating a free trade region that includes the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico). 
 212. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TAXATION TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2009) 
(discussing the different tax rates of members of the European Union) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 213. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/96, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L283) (EC) (“Member 
States shall impose taxation on energy products and electricity in accordance with this 
Directive.”). 
 214. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 17–20 (discussing the drawbacks of 
a carbon tax). 
 215. See Naomi Oreskes, Metaphors of Warfare and the Lessons of History: Time to 
Revisit a Carbon Tax?, 104 CLIMATIC CHANGE 223, 227–28 (2011) (discussing the argument 
that taxation does not guarantee reduction in emissions). 
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incentives under a carbon tax for polluters to lower their carbon emissions, 
but this does not ensure that the reductions will occur, or that they will be 
sufficient to avoid the disastrous impacts of global warming.216 Nothing in 
the carbon tax system implements new cleaner forms of energy.217 A carbon 
tax has the same limitations that cap-and-trade programs have in that they 
may not address the main underlying issues for the GHG emission 
legislation, environmental and public health.218 
 
B. Advantages of Carbon Taxation Over Cap-and-Trade 
 
 Carbon taxation has some clear-cut advantages over the current 
EU-ETS system as well as other cap-and-trade emission reduction 
strategies. These advantages are present in the implementation of the 
program, the certainty of the program’s effectiveness, the ability to enforce 
the carbon tax, and the environmental impact of the program.219 
 
1. Certainty of Cost and Benefit 
 
 It is clear that both carbon taxation and cap-and-trade systems are 
market-oriented schemes constructed to reduce carbon emissions.220 Yet, 
there is still an ongoing debate on which approach is superior.221 Perhaps 
the largest area of discrepancy between the two approaches is the benefit 
certainty versus cost certainty standard.222 
 In a cap-and-trade system, the cap, or maximum amount of 
allowable emissions, provides the environmental benefit from the emissions 
reduction.223 This is called the “benefit certainty.”224 “Benefit certainty,” 
however, does not mean that benefits will actually occur, as we have 
                                                                                                                                         
 216. See id. at 227 (arguing that neither cap-and-trade programs nor a tax on carbon 
emissions can guarantee that GHG emission reductions will be made). 
 217. See id. (stating that carbon taxes are only proven to raise revenue). 
 218. See id. at 228 (explaining that the public’s approach to a carbon tax regime affects 
the amount that GHG emissions are lowered). 
 219. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 37–45 (discussing the advantages of 
a carbon tax). 
 220. See id. at 5–7 (noting that both a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system are market 
based approaches). 
 221. See id. at 50 (concluding that a carbon tax is a better approach than cap-and-trade). 
 222. See id. at 36 (discussing the relationship of benefit certainty to cap-and-trade and 
cost certainty to a tax on carbon emissions). 
 223. See id. (“Cap and trade, because it imposes an overall cap on the level of 
emissions permitted in the economy, provides certainty as to the environmental benefit that 
results from its implementation.”). 
 224. See id. (discussing the meaning of “benefit certainty”). 
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noticed in the EU, which is the biggest flaw of cap-and-trade.225 
Additionally, all cap-and-trade programs have reversion mechanisms to a 
carbon tax should the price of carbon get out of hand.226 In other words, a 
country would never shut down its power sector simply because emission 
permits for the year were all used by November. 
 The carbon taxation system, on the other hand, relies on a pre-
determined carbon emissions price, set in advance, allowing emitters to 
plan future power plant upgrades to reduce emissions and improve 
efficiencies.227 It also allows consumers to plan their purchases.228 With this 
set pricing strategy, carbon taxation establishes cost certainty.229 Cap-and-
trade programs cannot match this cost certainty because there will be 
fluctuations in the market over time, and the cost will be adjusted 
accordingly.230 In practice, this stability in price that coincides with a 
carbon tax could prove to be as much as five times more cost-effective than 
cap-and-trade programs.231 It is also important to note that the “benefit 
certainty” of the cap-and-trade program can be nullified if the cap is set at 
an inappropriate level and there is no incentive for emitters to comply with 
the regulations.232 This is precisely what occurred in the initial phases of the 
EU-ETS.233 The “benefit certainty” was undermined because over-
allocation of allowances negated the incentive for emitters to comply with 
the regulation, leading to disappointing emissions reduction results.234 Thus, 
the certainty of the benefit is somewhat of a misnomer because the benefit 
is not concrete. In carbon taxation, while there is no “benefit certainty” (an 
                                                                                                                                         
 225. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing disadvantages of cap-and-trade). 
 226. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 43 (discussing safety valves as the 
only way to prevent cost uncertainty in cap-and-trade regimes). 
 227. See id. at 36 (“[T]he precise amount of the tax is set in advance.”). 
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 229. See id. at 42 (describing the pricing of a carbon tax regime). 
 230. See id. at 42–43 (discussing how market fluctuation and the changing price of 
allowances in a cap-and-trade system could undermine the entire system). 
 231. See Kenneth C. Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A Consensus Perspective on 
the Tax-Versus-Cap Debate 1 (July 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154638 (“A carbon tax . . . would provide price stability, and 
could theoretically be five times more cost-efficient than cap-and-trade.”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 232. See id. at 1 (“[T]he ‘environmental certainty’ of caps and standards is a dubious 
advantage if emissions are not actually capped at a sustainable level, and if the regulations 
provide no incentive for over compliance even when emission prices are very low.”). 
 233. See Hintermann, supra note 109, at 45 (describing the first phase of the EU-ETS). 
 234. See id. at 45–46 (stating that emissions were well under the cap set based on 
industry projections and the price of allowances dropped substantially). 
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issue addressed by carbon tax with reinvestment),235 there is, however, clear 
“cost certainty.”236 The debate between which “certainty” is better becomes 
tilted heavily in cost certainty’s favor when political intervention and 
unsustainable caps join the equation. In this regard, carbon taxation is a 
superior market-based approach to reduce GHG emissions. 
 
2. Implementing the Strategy 
 
 Cap-and-trade is a strategy wrought with complexity.237 This 
complexity is somewhat limited due to the “upstream” nature of the 
program.238 In essence, the cap imposes taxation onto the producer, rather 
than the final produced good, meaning most of the citizenry is unaffected 
by the taxation.239 Citizens will see the added cost, but do not need to 
purchase permits to pollute. While this appears to imply a more simple 
approach because fewer emitters are involved, the system creates 
complexity in implementation and oversight of the scheme.240 First, the 
cap-and-trade program calls for extensive data collection in order to 
establish the cap amount.241 Then a decision to allocate, evenly distribute, 
or auction allowances must be made.242 
 While this is simple in theory, the EU-ETS has shown it can be 
complex in its application and can create serious deficiencies if the program 
is not adjusted appropriately.243 When the legislation calls for free 
allowance allocation, the regulators in the scheme must decide who is to 
                                                                                                                                         
 235. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 613–14 (arguing for a regime of carbon tax with 
reinvestment). 
 236. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 42 (describing the cost certainty of 
carbon tax regimes). 
 237. See Zhang, supra note 107, at 1805 (stating that the complexity of the EU-ETS is 
“universally acknowledged”). 
 238. See Joseph Aldy & Robert Stavins, Economic Incentives in a New Climate 
Agreement 3 (Belfer Ctr. Sci. & Int’l Aff., Working Paper, 2008) (discussing policy choices 
that lead to upstream regulation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 239. See id. (stating that cap-and-trade works to limit the emissions of a producer). 
 240. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 38 (“[T]he trading in allowances 
needs to be set up and monitored: a system needs to be devised to prevent the same 
allowance from being used twice, and penalties need to be established for polluters who 
exceed their allowances.”). 
 241. See id. at 38–39 (explaining that one complexity of a cap-and-trade system is 
determining where to set the cap). 
 242. See id. at 38 (describing that another complexity of a cap-and-trade system is that 
“the proposal needs to determine how allowances will be created and distributed, either for 
free or by auction”). 
 243. See generally Petherick, supra note 64 (analyzing the cost of carbon in the 
European market). 
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receive the allowances and how many allowances they should receive.244 
Again, a simple-sounding task proved to be difficult during Phase I and II 
of the EU-ETS.245 In an auction of allowances, the regulating body must 
monitor the process of the auctioning to prevent fraud.246 This necessary 
fraud management strategy would also surely increase the cost of the cap-
and-trade program.247 Next, another system of monitoring needs to be 
enacted to ensure fair trading of the outstanding allowances, those allocated 
freely or auctioned off. This endeavor would ensure that allowances are 
utilized once, but not more.248 In addition, cap-and-trade legislation must 
create an international enforcement policy for rule breakers if allowances 
are traded across international borders.249 Lastly, provisions must be put in 
place to regulate banking and borrowing allowances.250 These provisions 
would create safety measures to protect against extreme cost uncertainty.251 
If the cap-and-trade program calls for offsets for carbon sequestration and 
storage, a provision must also regulate these activities.252 Cap-and-trade 
programs, if they are to be effective, must also entail intense monitoring 
and reporting initiatives.253 It cannot be denied that all the requirements 
inherent in a cap-and-trade program impose complexities onto the 
implementation of the program.254 Further, the more complex the program, 
the longer it takes to create and adjust each aspect of the scheme.255 In 
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enforcement costs can easily become unwieldy in a complex cap-and-trade program). 
 254. See id. at 38 (explaining the complexities of cap and trade systems as they 
compare to taxes on carbon emissions). 
 255. See Kenneth Richards & Stephanie Richards, The Evolution and Anatomy of 
Recent Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate: Critique and Recommendations 110 (July 
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining the desirability of administrative simplicity in 
any program) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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summation, the EU should cut its losses with the ETS altogether and adopt 
a new program, one based on a carbon tax, rather than attempt to adjust the 
failing cap-and-trade program, which is so difficult and slow to implement. 
 Carbon taxation is built around a simpler approach that can be 
implemented into the framework that already exists in the European 
Commission. There is no need to create and regulate a market, a continuing 
struggle for the EU-ETS. A carbon tax could be imposed on all goods and 
services in Europe, as well as on all imported goods and services.256 For 
example, the tax could be set at ten dollars for every ton of carbon emitted 
to create the commodity. The tax could then increase over time as emitters 
become more accustomed to the tax.257 A carbon tax program can become 
more complex, but complicating it by incorporating tax credits and other 
measures would make it more cumbersome to manage. Regardless, it is 
much simpler to adopt and manage than similar cap-and-trade 
approaches.258 
 
3. Revenue Creation 
 
 Another clear advantage of a carbon tax-based program for 
reducing carbon emissions over cap-and-trade based programs is that a 
carbon tax, no matter the form, will create revenue for the administrator.259 
For example, a very low tax of only ten dollars per ton of carbon would 
generate multiple billions of dollars for the EU each year.260 Of course, the 
higher the tax levied on the carbon emitted, the greater the revenue 
amount.261 The use of this revenue would be very determinative of how the 
regulated population felt toward the legislation. One of the biggest 
criticisms against the carbon tax approach is that it has the potential to be 
jeopardized by becoming regressive.262 A cap-and-trade system has the 
same drawback.263 
                                                                                                                                         
 256. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 32 (stating that a carbon tax would 
be imposed on all carbon, oil, and natural gas, whether domestically produced or imported). 
 257. See id. at 32–33 (explaining that the tax could be adjusted over time to produce the 
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 258. See id. at 7 (arguing that a carbon tax system is comparatively easier to implement, 
adjust, and enforce). 
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 Low-income households spend a greater percentage of their income 
on energy needs than do higher income earning households.264 Accordingly, 
the brunt of any rise in the energy price will be felt more severely by the 
low-income earning households.265 Also, certain nations that are more 
dependent on coal will participate more in the carbon emissions reductions 
set forth in the program.266 The best policy for the EU, or any regulating 
group around the world, is to accommodate these political and economic 
issues while not compromising the principles that make the program cost-
effective.267 If enacted correctly, with price stability, carbon taxes will 
generate revenues that may be utilized to provide compensation to those 
most affected by the tax. 
 
4. Environmental Impact 
 
 While we may lose our focus by looking exclusively at economics, 
politics, and finance; it is important to remember why this legislation is 
important. The goal is to protect the environment and the public’s health.268 
In terms of climate change, everyone is a polluter, though not everyone 
pollutes to the same extent.269 Perhaps the biggest downfall for the 
proposals to date is that neither cap and trade nor carbon taxes have 
provided proof that there will be a real reduction of carbon emissions if 
their approach is adopted.270 Both merely propose that a reduction of carbon 
emissions will likely follow the adoption of the program.271 Cap-and-trade 
                                                                                                                                         
 264. See Dallas Burtraw, Rich Sweeney & Margaret Walls, The Incidence of U.S. 
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 271. See id. (stating that the results of these programs are essentially hypothetical). 
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assumes that market-based implementations will provide enough incentive 
for emitters to invest in and utilize new, “greener” technologies.272 
Proponents of cap-and-trade believe that this incentive will lead to an 
overall reduction in carbon emissions.273 On the other hand, carbon taxation 
is designed on the theory that by increasing the cost of carbon production 
throughout the chain of distribution, the use of carbon intensive products 
will be less desirable and the public will be prompted to purchase items 
with a lower carbon intensity or usage.274 Estimates and educated guesses 
as to the effect of any particular program’s efficiency in lowering GHG 
emissions jeopardizes the credibility of the approach as a whole, and may 
jeopardize the environment as well. 
 
IV. Carbon Tax With Reinvestment 
A. All Consumers Pay Under Carbon Tax with Reinvestment 
 
 As I have previously argued, neither cap-and-trade nor carbon 
taxation are capable of reducing GHG emissions with any concrete 
certainty.275 If the EU and other nations are to have a resonant impact on 
carbon emissions in the future, it is imperative that the system approaches 
lowering GHG emissions aggressively. The EU-ETS has shown that 
without a program that will approach lowering carbon emissions with 
certainty; it may prove difficult to achieve the emissions reductions nations 
are hoping to achieve.276 To ensure a decrease in emissions, new legislation 
must look to regulate all emitters, not just a certain subset.277 A better 
alternative is the carbon tax with reinvestment approach.278 A carbon tax 
with reinvestment is unique in that it directly targets all carbon consumers 
and taxes them through a downstream strategy.279 Uniquely, a carbon tax 
with reinvestment looks to incorporate the societal costs of GHG emissions 
                                                                                                                                         
 272. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 72, at 11 (arguing that utilities will spend money 
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and promote emissions reductions.280 The most obvious difference with this 
program is the reinvestment piece, which will work to nullify any doubt 
that the proposal will achieve the goals of benefitting society through 
environmental and health implications.281 The monetary payment acts as a 
payoff of the environmental costs imposed from the destructive emission of 
carbon, and it serves to send an undeniable message about how serious 
curbing GHG emissions will be taken.282 Constructing environmentally 
friendly energy production facilities will only further the message that the 
tax itself sends. 
 
B. The Basics of Carbon Tax with Reinvestment (CTR) 
 
 One of the most striking aspects of carbon tax with reinvestment is 
its simplicity. For example, the tax could be initially set at five dollars per 
ton of carbon contained within the product based on emissions intensity.283 
The tax can be assessed either at the source or at the border on the good or 
service based on the emission’s intensity (GPD/ton of CO2), with the tax 
eventually paid by the consumer, as is always the case for a carbon tax or 
cap-and-trade.284 Because everyone is an emitter based on carbon intensity, 
no one is exempt from the tax.285 Following an implementation period, the 
tax rate increases systematically and provides certainty to industries and 
consumers for investment and planning purposes.286 Despite an analysis 
remarking on the ability of increasing taxes to reduce future emissions, the 
carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on the public option to reduce 
carbon emissions.287 Unlike cap-and-trade and a carbon tax, the carbon tax 
with reinvestment is not linked to the merely possible acquiescence of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 280. See id. (“This carbon tax with reinvestment would directly tax all carbon emitters 
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power sector to adopt greener means of production.288 The revenue from the 
taxation will be funneled into building new infrastructure for energy 
production.289 Wind, geothermal, nuclear, and solar facilities and other 
renewable and clean sources of power are built, taking the place of power 
plants that rely on carbon-emitting processes.290 This alleviates the need to 
provide other incentives such as tax credits or incentives to develop and 
build these industries. 
 Further, because the revenue for the construction of these facilities 
will come from the tax implemented by the program, there will be no 
disadvantages for utility providers, because they will not bear the burden of 
paying for building new plants.291 Perhaps even more significantly, there 
will be no loss of jobs or production.292 The investment in new 
infrastructure will actually create new jobs, estimated at over 600,000 jobs 
for construction and over 2.5 million direct, indirect, and induced jobs for 
the EU.293 By transforming old power installations into new low-to-no 
emissions facilities, the carbon tax with reinvestment program will more 
quickly force emissions down without having to rely on market forces.294 
Strategically, this tax is designed to be phased out over time.295 Although 
the tax rate rises from five dollars to fifty dollars per ton over a ten-year 
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period, there is a peak in total tax in the tenth year, followed by a rapidly 
declining period of tax collection as a percentage of the economy.296 This 
occurs, as shown in Figure 1, because as new power plants replace older 
power plants the level of emissions declines significantly.297 Figure 1 is the 
flow chart to explain how funds are collected and used. The model is based 
on all GHG emissions being taxed. The taxes raised are used to order and 
construct new power plants.298 These power plants, once on line, replace 
existing power plant infrastructure.299 Replacing existing power plants 
reduces emissions, resulting in future lower tax revenues.300 
 




 In twenty years, EU countries or the U.S., slower growing 
developed countries, can achieve a thirty-eight to seventy-four percent 
                                                                                                                                          
 296. See id. at 623 (describing the tax structure). 
 297. See id. at 611 (discussing how replacing power plants will reduce emissions 
significantly). 
 298. See id. at 610 (explaining that the tax will be funneled to constructing new power 
plants). 
 299. See id. at 611 (discussing how current power plants will be replaced by nuclear, 
geothermal, solar, and wind facilities, among others). 
 300. See id. (explaining how the new infrastructure will emit less carbon, causing less 
carbon tax to be collected). 
 301. Unless otherwise noted, all figures appearing in this article were created by the 
author for his dissertation: Carbon and Energy: The Limitations of Utility and Building 
Infrastructure (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
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reduction in GHG emissions in the building and utilities sector.302 The 
benefits afforded to all nations or unions that adopt the carbon tax with 
reinvestment are substantial.303 As dirty, expensive energy is eventually 
replaced with energy that is clean and inexpensive, nations will have 
adopted highly energy-efficient devices.304 
 The tax begins simply enough at five dollars per ton of CO2 and 
increases by five dollars per ton each year until the tax reaches fifty dollars 
per ton in year ten.305 Figures 2 and 3 show the economic impact of this tax 
based on revenues raised from that tax as a percentage of the EU and U.S. 
economies. The tax peaks at 1.84% for the EU-27 and 2.49% for the United 
States. It peaks higher in the U.S. because the U.S. is more carbon-intensive 
(using more fossil fuels) than the EU.306 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 302. See infra Figs. 6 & 7. 
 303. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (highlighting the benefits of switching from dirty 
to clean energy). 
 304. See id. (analyzing the switch from dirty to clean energy). 
 305. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 611 (discussing the carbon tax with reinvestment 
model). 
 306. See id. at 595 (explaining that the United States has higher regional carbon 
emission intensities). 
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 307. Revenues are calculated at five dollars per ton of GHG emissions in year one, 
rising by five dollars per ton each year until the carbon tax rate reaches fifty-dollars per ton 
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 The revenues from the CTR are used to order clean power plants to 
replace existing power plants.308 This reinvestment results in significant 
new power plants construction, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 
shows the purchases in the EU and Figure 5 those in the United States.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 308. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 621 (showing a figure displaying power plant 
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 309. Figures 4 and 5 indicate the amount of power plants purchased and constructed 
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 These power plant purchases and replacements produce real 
emissions benefits. While I have modeled multiple scenarios, I present 
these as intermediate, conservative results. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 310. The construction line trails orders indicating that a plant ordered needs to be 
constructed, which takes a significant amount of time. While not calculated, every billion 
dollars in construction expenditure creates approximately 25,000 direct and indirect jobs, 
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 311. This figure shows the impact of replacing high emission power plants with low 
emission power plants. For the EU-27 total emissions decline by forty-eight percent, and by 
sixty-three percent for buildings and utilities as power plants are completed. This case, using 
an eight-two-three scenario, implies that it will take eight, two and three years to order, 
construct, permit and bring online nuclear, solar/wind and geothermal power plant among 
others. In general, results can be much better for quicker permitting periods and lower for 
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Figure 7: U.S. Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are Completed312 
 
 
C. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Complies with International Law 
 
 It is important to recognize and consider the potential difficulties 
that arise under international trade law when attempting to mitigate climate 
change, particularly through a cap-and-trade program. As previously 
argued313 in relation to the United States, this proposal to implement a 
carbon tax with reinvestment is in compliance with international law.314  
 Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade 
Organization (GATT/WTO) framework, nations have three important 
obligations. First, they must adhere to the most favored nation (MFN) 
principle.315 This requires that all like products be treated the same between 
                                                                                                                                         
 312. For the U.S., the results are forty-seven percent for total emissions and sixty-seven 
percent for buildings and utilities. The results are improved for buildings and utilities since 
the U.S. relies more heavily on coal; however, total results are less since the U.S. relies more 
heavily on oil for transportation. 
 313. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 615–17 (arguing that a carbon tax with reinvestment 
complies with international trade law). 
 314. See id. (placing the implementation of a carbon tax in the context of international 
trade obligations of the United States). 
 315. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, III, XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196–98, 204–06, 224–26 [hereinafter GATT] (describing the three 
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countries.316 The foreign products are not to be treated any less favorably 
than national products under the National Treatment principle.317 Third, and 
most relevant to cap-and-trade, is the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions.318 This prohibition prevents countries from issuing any 
embargoes, quotas, or licensing schemes on both imported and exported 
products.319 
 A carbon tax with reinvestment, however, does not suffer from 
these problems.320 Each country and company is subject to the same 
treatment for the same conduct.321 There is no restriction or additional tariff 
on imported and exported goods.322 Therefore, this proposal finds a 
common ground between international trade law and the international goal 
of mitigating climate change.  
 The effectiveness of a carbon tax with reinvestment on the 
international level could benefit the European Union in several ways.323 
First, effective emission reductions would mitigate the negative 
environmental, social, and health impacts of climate change.324 Second, the 
tax would encourage economic advancements through infrastructure 
development and job creation.325 Finally, the international effects resulting 
from the carbon tax with reinvestment would assist the European Union in 
maintaining its standing as a world leader.326 
                                                                                                                                         
 316. See id. at 196–98 (introducing the most favored nation principle, which states that 
any advantage given to one product must be accorded to any similar product originating 
from any territory). 
 317. See id. at 204–06 (stating that the national treatment principle, which states that 
any imported products must not face taxes that are not applied to products of national 
origin). 
 318. See id. at 224–26 (outlining the restriction on quantitative restrictions). 
 319. See id. (stating that no party to the treaty shall use quotas, import, or export 
licenses on imports from other territories); see also Erik B. Bartenhagen, The Intersection of 
Trade and the Environment: An Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on 
Ecolabeling Programs, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 60 (1997) (explaining that the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions “prevents member countries from using quotas, embargoes, or 
licensing schemes on imported or exported products”). 
 320. See Sewalk, supra note 79 at 615–17 (discussing the advantages of a carbon tax 
over cap-and-trade in the context of international trade law). 
 321. See id. (noting the technical aspects of a carbon tax). 
 322. See id. (stating that because a carbon tax is neutral to producers, it does not create 
impermissible tariffs). 
 323. See Young, supra note 191, at 1389 (explaining the potential benefits of a carbon 
emissions reduction policy). 
 324. See id. at 1388 (suggesting that a global emissions reduction policy would help 
mitigate “significant losses in agriculture and health”). 
 325. See id. at 1389 (arguing that a global emissions reduction policy would propel a 
country’s economic position). 
 326. See id. (suggesting that the United States, if it had implemented an emissions 
reduction policy, could “uphold its standing as a world leader”). 
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V. The EU Should Adopt Carbon Tax With Reinvestment in Place of the 
Current ETS Program 
A. Benefits to the EU 
 
 If the EU were to drop the failing ETS program, it would not only 
reap the benefits of climate legislation that is simple to implement and both 
environmentally and economically efficient, it would also effectively usher 
in a new age of climate change policy around the world. Adopting a carbon 
tax with reinvestment approach would still allow Europe to uphold 
previously enforced tenements from the cap-and-trade scheme, but also 
enable the legislation to be much more flexible in response to price changes 
and volatility induced by external pressures.327 Also, the revenue generated 
from the tax could immediately be utilized to construct new low-carbon 
emitting energy facilities.328 One of the major critiques regarding the EU-
ETS is that for all the money that it took to enact and maintain the reduction 
strategy, the EU could have had a greater impact if they had instead focused 
on funding building new “green” infrastructure.329 The carbon tax with 
reinvestment solves that problem by both benefitting from the lesser cost of 
implementation that would be inherent in a carbon tax approach, and by 
channeling money toward the building of cleaner energy sources.330 Carbon 
tax with reinvestment represents the quickest way that the EU could begin 
to cut down on GHG emissions because the revenue will be available as 
soon as the program is underway.331 Adopting the program would also 
guarantee that energy prices throughout Europe would fall as alternative 
energy projects continue to be built at no cost to the utilities.332 
 A carbon tax with reinvestment is a designedly streamlined 
approach to ensure feasibility and effectiveness.333 Starting a CTR at five 
dollars per ton of CO2
334 and then increasing the level each year until it 
                                                                                                                                         
 327. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 606 (explaining that enforcing a carbon tax would 
only require use of current agencies and their existing staffs). 
 328. See id. at 607 (stating that the revenue generated from a carbon tax could be 
returned to the public or be used for other means). 
 329. See Maher, supra note 133 (describing the main criticisms of the EU-ETS). 
 330. See supra Fig. 2 (showing the amount of revenue the EU would collect as a 
percentage of its GDP if it were to switch to a CTR approach). 
 331. See Maher, supra note 133 (explaining that carbon pricing would be the cheapest 
and most efficient way to cut GHG emissions). 
 332. See id. (explaining that one of the biggest problems with the current emissions 
trading system is the fluctuation of energy prices). 
 333. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 609 (suggesting that a carbon tax would be simple, 
feasible, and extremely effective). 
 334. See id. at 610 (discussing the mechanics of a carbon tax with reinvestment 
proposal). 
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reaches a peak of fifty dollars per ton335 would provide market certainty, 
while allowing the construction and materials sectors to build capacity to 
avoid demand-induced inflation.336 The revenues from the tax would peak, 
and then decline rapidly as the emissions decline due to the adoption of 
cleaner energy sources.337 The tax could be administered under the 
European Commission because it will utilize the same tax-monitoring 
techniques that the EU has had in place for years.338 
 The European economy is increasingly becoming dependent on 
energy and infrastructure.339 With reinvestment of the revenues from a 
carbon tax, countries in the EU would stimulate their economies, creating 
jobs for their citizens, while lowering GHG emissions. Most carbon tax 
schemes are not capable of being “benefit certain,” because there can be no 
sound guarantee that the tax will encourage emitters to invest in cleaner 
technology.340 A carbon tax with reinvestment, however, does not stake its 
effectiveness on the ability or will of the utilities, industry and public to 
adopt new technologies to reduce carbon emissions.341 Rather, the CTR 
adopts the latest technologies in tried-and-true fields, relying on investment 
from the tax revenue to develop and construct cleaner alternative energy 
power plants to lower GHG emissions.342 Previous debates between cap-
and-trade proponents and carbon taxation proponents have always boiled 
down to deciding whether “cost certainty” or “benefit certainty” was the 
more desirable attribute of a carbon emissions reduction program.343 
Carbon taxation with reinvestment is able to provide both “certainties,” and 
is therefore the most effective approach to actually reduce GHG 
                                                                                                                                         
 335. See id. (explaining the graduated steps that would be used to increase the tax on 
carbon emissions). 
 336. See id. at 617 (arguing that a carbon tax is the best approach, in part because it 
would provide cost certainty and price stability). 
 337. See id. at 611 (explaining that tax revenues will initially rise and then over time the 
revenues will decrease because new non-emitting energy facilities will not face a carbon 
tax). 
 338. See id. at 606 (stating that while cap-and-trade imposes high costs and difficulties 
with monitoring, a carbon tax could utilize the same monitoring techniques already in place). 
 339. See David Victor & Linda Yueh, The New Energy Order: Managing Insecurities 
in the Twenty-first Century, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 61, 61 (2010) (noting that Europe is dependent 
on energy and is concerned about its energy security). 
 340. See Mann, supra note 202, at 45 (explaining that one of the main disadvantages of 
a carbon tax system is that it does not set carbon reduction targets and thus results in 
uncertain emissions). 
 341. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 613 (stating that a carbon tax with reinvestment does 
not rely on public accountability to reduce carbon emission). 
 342. See id. at 610 (noting that carbon tax reinvestment takes tax revenue and uses it to 
build new infrastructure for energy production). 
 343. See id. at 613–14 (explaining that until now, one had to choose either “cost 
certainty” or “benefit certainty” when picking an emissions reduction system). 
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emissions.344 The EU should not continue losing money while having little 
impact on lowering carbon emissions utilizing the ETS cap-and-trade 
program, and should switch to a carbon tax with reinvestment approach to 
ensure a cost-effective and efficient reduction in carbon emissions.345 
 
B. Autonomy and Fairness Among Nations 
 
 Not only would carbon tax with reinvestment make more 
environmental sense than the current EU-ETS program, it is also more 
malleable, allowing it to better serve each European nation’s particular 
needs. In the cap-and-trade system, the cap is set and remains rigid while 
the price of allowances fluctuates according to demand from emitters.346 
This style of carbon emission legislation has proven difficult to apply to an 
area as diverse as Europe.347 Each country in the EU has its own needs from 
a climate change initiative according to its current energy infrastructure and 
economy.348 Germany relies more heavily on coal and Russian gas, while 
France uses more nuclear power, and Denmark has invested heavily in 
significant wind power capacity.349 Each country has its own challenges, 
and the CTR would allow each country to set up its own priorities for 
reinvestment to rid itself of the highest carbon emission power plants.350 
                                                                                                                                         
 344. See id. (noting that a carbon tax with reinvestment can provide both “cost 
certainty” and “benefit certainty”). 
 345. See id. at 609–10 (explaining that there is no data to suggest that cap-and-trade is 
actually reducing emissions, and a more effective and efficient market-based approach is a 
carbon tax with reinvestment). 
 346. See Nell & Rezai, supra note 82, at 8 (“Enforcement of the cap is difficult and 
trading of emission certificates are exposed to speculative investments, generating a high 
volatility of the carbon price as the European example shows.”). 
 347. See COELHO, supra note 63, at 3 (noting that the “collective target [for emission 
reduction] was translated into differentiated national emissions targets for each Member 
State according to the ‘burden-sharing’ agreement”). 
 348. See id. (“Each Member State however is responsible for their Kyoto targets, which 
cover other sectors, either by reducing emissions at source or by buying credits from offset 
projects.”). 
 349. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 2013 11, 
15 (2013), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/ 
publication/KeyWorld2013.pdf (providing data regarding Germany’s reliance on imported 
natural gas and production of coal for consumption) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see id. at 17 (noting that France is 
the second highest consumer of nuclear energy in the world); see also Wind Energy, 
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF DENMARK, http://denmark.dk/en/green-living/wind-energy/ (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (stating that twenty-eight percent of the electricity supply in the 
country is from wind power) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 350. See Young, supra note 191, at 1391–94 (describing the flexibility of a carbon tax 
and arguing that it could be “evaluated periodically and adjusted”).  
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 Carbon taxation with reinvestment is flexible enough to allow each 
country in the program to maintain autonomy and receive equal benefit 
according to its need.351 Each country that participates in the carbon tax 
with reinvestment approach would have its own tax rates, and each country 
would collect its own share of taxes to rebuild its power facilities.352 In 
essence, thirty-one different carbon tax rates would operate in the EU under 
this approach.353 
 Another important measure that can be implemented within the 
framework of a carbon tax with reinvestment approach is border tax 
adjustments.354 These adjustments are designed to create a fairer playing 
field between domestic producers who are faced with constraints on their 
GHG emissions and foreign competitors who have no such restrictions.355 
This strategy has been proposed under the EU-ETS to help European 
nations compete with other countries like the U.S. and China.356 Countries 
operating without climate change mitigation have an economic advantage 
because they are typically able to offer lower prices because they are not 
being taxed or punished for their carbon output.357 If border tax adjustments 
were implemented with carbon taxation with reinvestment, it would serve 
to strengthen each country’s ability to enjoy autonomy while cooperating 





                                                                                                                                         
 351. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 584 (explaining that an EU-wide tax proposal was 
unpopular because member nations considered it an affront to their sovereign tax power). 
 352. See id. at 582 (“The tax is structured so that there is no incentive to invest in 
production in non-compliant regions.”). 
 353. See id. (examining alternatives to cap-and-trade regimes that might provide more 
incentive for each country to reduce carbon emissions). 
 354. See generally Stéphanie Monjon & Philippe Quirion, Addressing Leakage in the 
EU ETS: Border Adjustment of Output-Based Allocation? 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1957 
(2011) (examining the competitiveness problems with the EU cap-and-trade system and 
border tax adjustments as a response). 
 355. See id. at 1958 (explaining that border adjustments are a “trade measure designed 
to level the playing field between domestic producers facing costly climate policy and 
foreign producers with no or little constraint on their GHG emissions”). 
 356. See id. at 1957 (noting a recent EU Directive that mentions border adjustments as 
a possible solution to the problem of carbon leakage). 
 357. See id. at 1958 (“[T]he EU ETS increases the production cost of European 
producers in GHG intensive sectors, some of which are exposed to international 
competition.”). 
 358. See id. at 1970 (discussing certain European countries and suggesting that “a 
border adjustment covering only imports may be easier to negotiate because it generates 
public revenues, which may be redistributed to exporting countries”). 
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C. An Example to the U.S. and the World 
 
 GHG emissions are unlike many other regulated articles as they are 
not stationary, so their damaging effects are not limited to any particular 
region.359 Carbon emissions travel around the Earth’s atmosphere and create 
the “global” climate change issue we know today.360 This phenomenon 
clearly implies that tackling the issue of global climate change must be a 
unified endeavor among nation states and unions of nations.361 If nations 
around the world are unwilling to adopt climate change regulation and take 
serious steps to mitigate their carbon emissions, the concentration of these 
harmful gases in the atmosphere could rise to twice the level of pre-
industrialized levels before the end of the century.362 Many proponents of 
climate change policy viewed the Kyoto Protocol as the tool that would 
create cohesion among nations to address climate change holistically.363 
The Kyoto Protocol was an international treaty that set regulations on 
industrialized countries to attempt to curb GHG emissions.364 There has not 
been an international effort to rally around the Kyoto Protocol in the way 
that many climate scientists hoped.365 This only further strengthens the 
argument that the world desperately needs a new plan and direction, one 
that actually works, to unify the world in the joint effort of lowering GHG 
emissions. 
                                                                                                                                         
 359. See Hans Gersbach & Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Developing Countries, 
1 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 8685, 2011) (explaining how 
“greenhouse gases travel around the world”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 360. See id. (noting the emissions burden carried by developing countries around the 
world). 
 361. See Johnathon H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation 
to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“Without concerted 
efforts by nearly all industrialized and industrializing nations to drastically reduce net 
greenhouse gas . . . emissions, atmospheric concentrations will likely grow to double those 
of pre-industrial levels before century’s end.”). 
 362. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 37 (describing the changes in 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gas emissions). 
 363. See Christina Figueres, Environmental Issues: Time to Abandon Blame-Games and 
Become Proactive, THE ECON. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012, 5:51 AM), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-15/news/35836633_1_emission-
reduction-targets-global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-climate-change (detailing how the Kyoto 
Protocol was initially seen as a rallying cry for nations of the world) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 364. See id. (describing the commitment of thirty-seven countries to reduce emissions 
to levels below their 1990 levels). 
 365. See id. (“Governments are driving change, but have not yet proven their intent 
through a robust and immediate implementation of what has already been promised.”). 
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 If the EU were to abandon the ETS system, which has done little to 
advance the lowering of carbon emissions toward a level that is required to 
limit global climate change, and adopt a carbon tax with reinvestment, it 
could likely produce a chain reaction with other countries following suit. 
One country keeping a close eye on EU policies on climate change is the 
U.S.366 A carbon taxation system would also be the best approach for the 
U.S., but many legislators still lean toward cap-and-trade-type programs to 
address climate change.367 It would likely be foolish to follow the EU down 
the path of market-based carbon emissions regulation given the ETS’s 
checkered record.368 The U.S. has had extensive experience working within 
the framework of an economy-wide excise tax.369 Setting up a new cap-and-
trade-based program would not only be very difficult to draft, it would 
likely take years to implement, which is more time wasted battling against 
global climate change.370 A carbon tax with reinvestment would be 
comparatively easy to enact because it fits into already-existing tax laws.371 
Many climate change scientists believe that governments have already 
waited too long to initiate climate change measures.372 More time equates to 
a greater harm to the environment due to GHG emissions.373 As Figure 7 
showed, significant emissions reductions are possible in the U.S. 
 The very same benefits that will be realized by countries in the EU 
would be realized by states in the U.S. if it were to adopt a carbon tax with 
reinvestment program.374 The U.S., like Europe, would see an immediate 
                                                                                                                                         
 366. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 618 (discussing the U.S. observation of Europe’s 
cap-and-trade initiative). 
 367. See Bruce McClain & Heidi Meier, The U.S. Cap and Trade Initiative: Current 
Status and Potential Impact on Business, 28 AM. J. OF BUSINESS 1, 13 (2013) (displaying 
recent cap-and-trade legislation in the United States and its support in Congress). 
 368. See generally George Daskalakis & Raphael Markellos, Are the European Carbon 
Markets Efficient?, 17 REV. OF FUTURES MARKETS 103 (2008) (discussing the potential for 
inefficiencies in the European cap-and-trade system because the carbon allowances do not 
reflect all available information). 
 369. See Sewalk, supra note 79, at 618 (arguing that a carbon tax, utilizing existing 
excise tax laws, could be quickly enacted). 
 370. See Zhang, supra note 107, at 1805 (discussing the complex arrangement and 
initiation of the European ETS scheme). 
 371. See Young, supra note 191, at 1394 (stating that a carbon tax would be “relatively 
simple to fit into our current tax system” even though it “may require a substantial 
reconstruction of the environmental and energy sections in the tax code”). 
 372. See Craig, supra note 6, at 6 (“American law and policy are not keeping up with 
climate change impacts and the need for adaptation.”). 
 373. See id. at 12 (“[W]ithout mitigation efforts, mass destruction of both natural 
systems and human societies becomes an increasingly likely eventuality.”). 
 374. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (“[T]he goal of the [carbon tax with 
reinvestment] is to potentially refund monies collected over a longer time period through 
cheaper and cleaner energy.”). 
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influx of revenue from the approach that would be utilized to change the 
highest carbon emitting facilities into low-to-no-carbon emitting 
facilities.375 And the benefits in terms of economic stimulus and clean 
energy self-sufficiency would be significant, benefiting the whole world.376 
States in the U.S. would also reap benefits of new energy facilities, which 
would not cost them anything.377 This means an influx of jobs for the 
construction of the new low carbon emitting facilities and for the operation 
and maintenance of those facilities.378 Also, just as citizens in European 
countries would soon be paying much less for energy under a carbon tax 
with reinvestment approach, so too would citizens of the U.S.379 Not only 
would the U.S. be embarking on a new era of providing clean and 
renewable energy options to its citizens at a lower price, but it would be 
creating jobs throughout the country and it would be reducing the high 
levels of carbon emissions that it has produced for generations. 
 An implemented carbon tax with reinvestment strategy in Europe 
would put pressure on other nations to adopt stricter GHG emission 
measures.380 The carbon leakage that has proven to be an issue in the 
current EU-ETS strategy would be nullified by a CTR’s ability to tax all 
products at a rate according to carbon intensity.381 This amount would be 
determined by the total emissions in an economy or region, divided by the 
GDP of that economy or region, and easily calculated by summing the 
grams of carbon dioxide released per mega joule of energy produced, or the 
ratio of greenhouse gas emissions produced to GDP.382 This strategy creates 
an equitable trading system between nations, and nullifies the threat of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 375. See id. at 142 (noting that the program would provide a “revenue stream based on 
a carbon tax that replaces the existing power infrastructure, thereby reducing total 
emissions”). 
 376. See Adler, supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
 377. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that “[a]s new power plants are 
constructed using . . . funds (collected from taxpayers) and transferred to PUCs and utilities, 
the total capital invested by the utility over time is lowered, thereby resulting in lower 
electricity prices”). 
 378. See id. at 148 (“[I]t produces more secure energy future and environmental future 
and creates a significant number of jobs.”). 
 379. See Young, supra note 191, at 1379 (discussing the aspects of a carbon tax that 
would discourage energy companies from passing increased costs to consumers).  
 380. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 44 (“A carbon tax sends a clear 
signal to polluters: pollution imposes a negative externality on others, and you should be 
forced to internalize that cost by paying the tax.”). 
 381. See id. at 32 (“The tax rate would . . . reflect the increase in the harmful effects of 
carbon dioxide emissions. A carbon tax thereby would provide a price signal that 
captures . . . the harmful effects of carbon dioxide emissions.”). 
 382. See Wojciech Budzianowski, Target for National Carbon Intensity of Energy by 
2050: A Case Study of Poland’s Energy System, 46 ENERGY 575, 576–77 (2012) (explaining 
the methodology for determining carbon intensity). 
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EU being undermined by carbon leakage to other markets.383 Taken a step 
further, taxing imports by their carbon intensity creates a powerful 
incentive for EU trading partners to adopt emissions strategies as well.384 
Table 1 compares emissions intensity for several U.S. states and different 
EU and World countries. 
 
Table 1: Emissions Intensity, Comparing U.S. States vs. Select Countries385 
 
Emissions Intensities: U.S. States vs. Select Countries 
$ of GDP per Ton of CO2 Emissions 
Alabama $892.86 India $448.43 
California $3,703.70 Japan $3,448.28 
    France $4,000.00 
Washington $2,941.18 UK $3,571.43 
Colorado $1,886.79 Euro Area $2,500.00 
    United States $2,040.82 
Texas $1,250.00 Australia $1,298.70 





                                                                                                                                         
 383. See id. at 578 (using Poland as an example to show how carbon intensity can more 
fairly capture the emissions of any country). 
 384. See id. at 575 (noting that taxation by carbon intensity means “countries having 
highly GHG-intensive power sectors might need deep structural and technological changes 
of their energy systems”). 
 385. GDP and emissions data for U.S. states provided by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and the World Recourses Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicator Tool 
(CAIT), respectively. GDP for countries from World Bank 2012. Emission intensities 
calculated by dividing GDP of the selected Nations and U.S. States by tons of GHG 
emissions. This results in U.S. dollars of GDP per ton of GHG emissions, compared between 
countries or states. Structuring a program in this manner avoids the World Trade 
Organization challenge of method of production as global methods occur in different states 
and countries. 
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D. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Will Create an Influx of New Jobs 
 
 The reinvestment of an implemented carbon tax would have a 
significant impact on job creation in the EU.386 First, the revenue from the 
tax will be used to update old power facilities and establish new low- to no-
emission facilities, which will require a number of new construction jobs.387 
The EU, and any other nation that adopts carbon tax with reinvestment, 
could anticipate creating a minimum of 11,000 new direct construction jobs 
for each billion dollars in tax created revenue.388 These jobs would create an 
instant boost to any economy and functionally uplift the entire construction 
industry.389 Also, after the initial construction on the facilities is finished, 
additional jobs will be created for maintenance and operation of the greener 
facilities.390 This ensures that there will not be a drop in long-term 
employment numbers when the older facilities are retrofitted.391 Studies 
have shown that the number of jobs actually increases when low- to no-
carbon facilities are used instead of their higher-polluting counterparts.392 
This two-pronged employment benefit allows carbon taxation with 
reinvestment to have an immediate and lasting effect on economies that 
implement the approach.393 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 386. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the benefits that the carbon tax with 
reinvestment would have on employment). 
 387. See id. (explaining that such revenue could be “used to build low- or no-carbon-
emitting power plants, including but not limited to solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, 
nuclear and other non-emitting energy sources”). 
 388. See Rania Antonopoulos et al., Investing in Care: A Strategy for Effective and 
Equitable Job Creation 16 (Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 610, 2011), 
available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1291 (explaining that a $50 
billion investment creates 556,000 construction jobs) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 389. See id. at 16–27 (describing both direct and indirect job creation in the 
construction industry). 
 390. See Ulrike Lehr & Christian Lutz, Green Jobs? Economic Impacts of Renewable 
Energy in Germany 7 (2011) (presented at Ecomod 2011, International Conference on 
Economic Modeling, Azores, Portugal, June 29–July 1, 2011) (explaining that in 2009 in 
Germany, 339,500 people worked in energy production, operation, and maintenance) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 391. See id. at 7 (noting that the number of people employed in the operation and 
maintenance industry is expected to double by 2025). 
 392. See id. at 5 (“The increase of renewable energy leads in most of the scenarios 
studied to positive net employment, rising steadily, particularly from 2020 onwards.”). 
 393. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 145 (“[T]his policy . . . provides a significant stimulus 
to the construction industry, thereby stimulating the economy; . . . results in the production 
of clean power sooner, thereby reducing emissions; . . . resulting in lower total taxation to 
achieve the end result of reducing emissions.”). 
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E. Would Reinvestment in the Cap-and-Trade System Work? 
 
 Despite its initial appeal, a cap-and-trade system that also 
incorporates reinvestment simply does not work. A cap-and-trade system is 
based on emission caps that are assumed to be effective maximums, but 
reinvestment destroys this system by significantly reducing emissions 
supply.394 While in theory a cap-and-trade program can generate as much 
revenue as a carbon tax,395 it would require a very hands-off approach—
auctioning off all allowances, and providing no free permits as has been the 
procedure of EU-ETS so far.396 In fact, the EU-ETS has only actually 
auctioned around five percent of all the allowances it administered.397 With 
the lackluster performance of the EU-ETS thus far, it is difficult to imagine 
the program only auctioning off allowances in the future. The program will 
probably have to continue to rely on allocating allowances in at least some 
instances. This of course means less revenue for the program, and less 
revenue correlates to a decreased ability to address carbon emissions.398 
Thus, the ability for the EU to invest into new forms of clean energy would 
not be as robust, leaving the EU again in the unenviable position of 
implementing climate change legislation that is not actually promoting the 




                                                                                                                                         
 394. See supra Part III.B.4 (describing the way in which carbon emissions will be 
reduced over time if a carbon tax with reinvestment plan is adopted). 
 395. See Driesen, supra note 96, at 5 (“Many regulators and scholars recognize that 
auctioning enhances efficiency, avoids windfall profits, and generates revenues that 
government can spend to further advance environmental or other societal goals . . . .”). 
 396. See id. at 18 (explaining that the 2009 amendment made full auctioning the “basic 
principle” for allocating allowances after receipt of free permits led to substantial windfall 
profits for European electric utilities). 
 397. See Corina Haiti, International Center for Climate Governance, Recycling the 
Auction Revenue from Phases I and II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 2 (International 
Ctr. For Climate Governance Reflection No. 15/2013, 2013), available at 
http://www.iccgov.org/FilePagineStatiche/Files/Publications/Reflections/15_Reflection_Mar
ch_2013.pdf (graphing the percentage of allowances auctioned during Phases I and II of the 
ETS) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 398. See Sewalk, supra note 1, at 145 (explaining that the revenue generated from the 
program “results in the production of clean power sooner, thereby reducing emissions; 
and . . . leads to lower emissions, resulting in lower total taxation to achieve the end result of 
reducing emissions”). 
 399. See Driesen, supra note 96, at 4 (“[C]ap-and-trade programs do not necessarily 
deliver better environmental performance than the BAT regulations they aim to replace, a 
troublesome conclusion give the seriousness of the climate disruption problem.”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
 It is becoming ever more evident that countries around the world 
need to adopt climate change policies that proactively reduce GHG 
emissions. Global ecosystems are suffering what could prove to be 
irreparable harm due to the inability for nations and unions of nations to 
enact legislation that limits carbon emissions, which are currently wreaking 
havoc on our global climate. The EU-ETS was touted as the implement that 
would usher in a new era of climate change legislation that put the goals of 
public health care and environmental factors in harmony with an efficiently 
functioning market-based economic force. This cap-and-trade system, 
however, which has (1) seen the market for carbon become inoperable, (2) 
given windfall profits to certain large emitters while being over-
burdensome to smaller targeted emitters, and (3) failed to be effective in 
curbing Europe’s carbon output, is no longer a rallying point for other 
nations who are seeking to initiate climate change policies concerning GHG 
emissions. The EU-ETS’s faltering has created doubt in the climate change 
community, and has given climate change policy opponents one more 
talking point to challenge future measures worldwide.400 
 A carbon taxation system with reinvestment represents the best 
option for the EU at this point. Carbon taxation is uncomplicated in both 
implementation and design: it offers a “cost certainty” element that is 
missing in cap-and-trade programs, promises price stability to avoid the 
issues that have plagued the EU-ETS, and represents a unique ability to 
raise revenue for use by nations that implement the carbon taxation 
approach. A carbon tax that utilizes reinvestment is even more effective 
than either a carbon tax or cap-and-trade approach because it ensures that 
revenue raised by the taxation is used to combat carbon emissions and 
create new low-carbon or no-carbon facilities. Also, a carbon tax with 
reinvestment works in a unique way to target all polluters of carbon, not 
just selected emitters who fall in the targeted cap area or selected taxation 
pool. To date, there has never been a climate change policy that could boast 
the unique advantages that carbon tax with reinvestment is able to utilize to 
ensure effectiveness. 
 Some policymakers argue that cap-and-trade is the best approach 
for climate change legislation.401 Much of the affinity toward cap-and-trade 
programs began because of successful programs in the past.402 One of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 400. See ETS RIP?, supra note 69 (explaining that members of the European 
Parliament appear ready to abandon the system entirely). 
 401. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the advantages of cap-and-trade). 
 402. See Driesen, supra note 96, at 13 (noting that the 1990 amendments to the Clean 
Air Act inaugurated the first major successes with emissions trading). 
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more prolific examples of cap-and-trade success is the U.S. acid rain 
reduction measures, which were implemented in 1995.403 Many proponents 
of the cap-and-trade approach to carbon emission regulation will use this 
program as an example of how well cap-and-trade works.404 The acid rain 
program, however, is different than most cap-and-trade programs in many 
ways, most notably in that it was not economy-wide.405 Furthermore, if a 
tax with reinvestment scheme had been used to reduce sulfur in the 
atmosphere, it would have been more effective. 
 The EU-ETS is the biggest and best example of a large-scale 
trading-based program designed to produce environmental impacts.406 As 
illuminated above, the EU-ETS is proving that large-scale cap-and-trade 
can be a very fragile system as shown in Figure 8. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 403. See id. (explaining that the acid rain trading program demonstrated that a properly-
designed trading program could be successfully implemented). 
 404. See id. at 14–15 (describing the way that the acid rain cap-and-trade program 
impacted the Kyoto Protocol’s formulation). 
 405. See id. at 13 (explaining that Congress placed individual caps on each regulated 
unit in the electricity industry). 
 406. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 98, at 19 (explaining the advantages that 
the EU-ETS has over the efforts of the United States). 
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Figure 8: No Certainty - EU-ETS Carbon Price (Euros / Ton) August 2008 




 Carbon taxation with reinvestment will create a downstream tax 
effect that will ensure that no one is exempt from enforcement of the 
legislation. The revenue that is created by the tax will be available 
immediately and the monies will be directed at creating the sincere carbon 
reducing impact that has proved elusive for the EU-ETS. By constructing 
low- or non-emitting power sources like wind, geothermal, nuclear, and 
solar, the carbon tax with reinvestment revenue will be put to use in a very 
effective way. The global environment will benefit from the new clean 
energy options that will have taken the place of high carbon emitting plants. 
Further, the citizens of EU countries will experience economic benefits 
because they will be utilizing cheaper energy that runs from the new, more 
efficient infrastructure. European countries in the program will see new 
jobs spring up alongside the new power facilities, and the countries will 
become examples for the rest of the world to follow. For this reason, the 
successful implementation of a carbon tax with reinvestment program in the 
EU has the potential to influence the world and usher in a new age of 
environmentally responsible business practices that could prove fruitful for 
                                                                                                                                         
 407. This figure details the falling price for carbon emissions from the beginning of the 
EU-ETS carbon-trading program to early 2013. The figure is characterized by an overall 
downward price trend, along with high fluctuations on a monthly basis. 
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generations. Upon successful implementation, the EU’s trading partners 
would be encouraged to adopt the CTR, thus enabling emission reductions 
on a large scale, as shown in Figures 6 and 7.408 Significantly, successful 
implementation of the carbon taxation and reinvestment program in the EU 
would necessitate China’s adoption of a comparable program that would 
help it remain competitive in the global market. The world would benefit 
from reductions in total Chinese emissions, which are projected to rise to 
193% of today’s levels. 
 
Figure 9: China Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are 
Completed409 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 408. See supra notes 311–312 and accompanying text. 
 409. Total Chinese emissions would decline by thirteen percent from today’s levels, 
while emissions from industry and buildings would decline by nineteen percent. This is in 
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